10/05/1999 (2)
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Fire Ta'sk Force
MINUTES
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(J FIRE TASK FORCE MEETING
CITY OF CLEARWATER
October 5, 1 999
Present: Bill Horne Chair (non-voting)
Joe Calia Task Force Member
Joe Evich Task Force Member. arrived 3: 13 p.m.
Rowland Herald Task Force Member
Russ Kimball Task Force Member
George Kraus Task Force Member
John Lee Task Force Member
," Scott Nail Task Force Member - arrived 3:09 p.m.
Bill Schwab Task Force Member
"
Jean Stuart Task Force Alternate - arrived 3: 15 p.m.
Doug Williams Task Force Alternate
, ' Absent: Fran Briskman Task Force Member
William Sherman Task Force Member
Duke Tieman Task Force Member
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Also Present: Margie Simmons Financial Services Administrator
Sue Diana Assistant City Clerk
0 Patricia O. Sullivan Board Reporter
The Chair called the meeting to order at 3:05 p.m. at the Belcher Road Fire
Station.
To provide continuity for research, Items are In agenda ardor although not
necessarily discussed In that order.
ITEM #2 - Approval of Minutes
In reference to page 2, paragraph 4, sentence 7, Member Calio requested the
first word "Many" be replaced by the number "Thirteen."
,)
Member Kimball moved to approve the minutes of September 28, 1999, as
amended. The motion was duly seconded and carried unanimously.
, ITEM #3 - Presentation: One Citv. One Future. Safety Review
a) History, b) Division of Labor, c) Staffing Studies, and d) Questions
Firefighter Driver/Operator ,Jim Carino reviewed the report, One City. One
Future. Safety Review. (Attached as Exhibit A to these minutes)
0,
Mr. Carino discussed the team effort necessary to handle dangerous and
complex rescue situations and how understaffing jeopardizes safety. He stated by
mft10a99
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10/05/99
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meeting previous administrative requests to cut budgets, the department has
reached a critical Juncture. Staffing levels are 10% lower than 20 years ago while
staff workloads have increased. He said cuts In firefighter positions were made to
create administrative positions and to maintain them. He said when compared with
national averages, all City fire vehicle crews are understaffed. In response to a
question, Fire Chief Rowland Herald said salary differences between firefighters and
deputy chiefs are minor.
Mr. Carino reviewed population projections, noting the department must also
protect the safety of visitors and tourists as well as enclave residents within City
borders. While the projection for the year 2030 is a population of 160,000, the
report bases future needs on a population of 140,000. In response to a question,
Chief Herald said the City's population was 85,000 twenty years ago.
Mr. Carino said while Police Department staffing levels meet national
averages~ Fire Department levels of 1.21 FTEs (full-time equivalents) per 1,000
residents are significantly below the national average of 1.64. The Fire
Departments of Florida cities of comparable size hav~ average budgets of $20-
million. He reported firefighters work 56 hours per week. Those with EMS
(Emergency Medical Services) certification receive a 15 % bonus. All firefighters
must have at least EMT (Emergency Medical Technician) certification. All
firefighters receive 8 hours of training every 2 months.
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Mr. Carino reviewed the staffing needs and related dangers related to high-
rise, hospital, and structure fires, vehicular and industrial accidents, and helicopter
transfers. Multiple alarm fires decrease the department's ability to answer other
calls. Additional stations are needed for Sand Key and the area north of downtown.
He reviewed statistical data indicating understaffed crews suffer higher rates of
injury. He said fire engines should respond to calls within 5 minutes with a ladder
truck arriving within 7 minutes. Traffic, road conditions, and topography impede
the attainment of these goals.
The meeting recessed from 4:00 to 4: 10 p.m.
Concern was exprossed these issues had not been brought to the attention
of the budget committee in the mid 19805. Chief Herald said the Fire Department
was not run like a business previously. Staff is developing a business plan, which
will address future construction in the City and a vehicle replacement schedule. It
was noted few residents are cognizant of the need for fire services until they are
affected by an emergency.
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Mr. Carino estimated each new fire station will cost $1.7-million. The
estimate includes planning, design, construction, landscaping, fixtures, and furniture
costs. Not included are costs for land or apparatus. Fire inspector positions now
are held by civilians at lower salaries. In response to a challenge that he decrease
administration levels, Chief Herald reviewed the administrative support necessary
for the reorganization process. No internal succession plan exists and guidelines
need to be developed for equipment maintenance. Accreditation requires
mft10a99
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10105/99
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() administrative staff to gather necessary documentation, A goal is to increase the
. ' City's fire fighting ratil1g from 3 to 2. The rating level affects residents' fire
insurance rates,
Concern was expressed that Sand Key residents had paid significant impact
fees, while the City had invested minimal funds in the community. The Belcher
Road fire station, constructed in 1978, was the last one built in the City. It was
noted 50 firefighters qualify for retirement next year. Mr. Carino stated that a cost
reduction will result due to lower salaries for new employees once unused vacation
and sick time are paid to retirees.
Fire Chief Herald said the administrative staff is creating a career pathway
guide to staff promotion, which will include a line of succession. In response to a
question, Mr. Carino said the City is able to hire certified firefighters with EMT or
EMS accreditation. New hires participate in a one-week orientation and spend one
year on probation. Nearby cities'responded to more mutual aid calls than
Clearwater last year. Staffing leyels have been reduced at the beach and
downtown stations.
"Q
Mr. Carino reviewed Fire Department responsibilities including pool safety, air
pack maintenance, dive and water rescue team, SWAT and bicycle medics,
emergency management, mutual aid, answering Significantly more calls with old,
and sometimes unreliable equipment, CPR training, etc. He said the department
requests that staffing levels meet national averages. He said a dedicated funding
source Is needed. In response to a question, Fire Chief Herald said staff injuries
hav,e increased 9% since FY (fiscal year) 1992/93. Mr. Carino expressed concern
two of the City's three aerial ladder trucks are non-functioning. He reported
increased security measures have made building access more difficult. He said
increased staffing levels will improve safety.
In reference to the Knopf report, Clearwater Fire & Rescue Department
Management Study, Mr. Carino discussed his opposition to various report
conclusions. He felt the report was based on opinion rather than fact.
ITEM #4 - Facilitv Tour
A facility tour followed the meeting by those who were able to stay and
participate.
ITEM #5 - Miscellaneous
Establish Future Agendas
Chair Horne said the Fire Department's list of needs should be available for
discussion by October 19, 1999. Currently, three separate plans exist.
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Discussion ensued regarding Assistant City Manager Bill Horne1s October 1, 1999,
memorandum suggesting a proposed meeting schedule. Consensus was to
schedule future agendas: 1) October 12 - County Fire Officials Perspective on Fire
Service Needs and, Discussion of Knopf Report; 2) October 19 - Validation of Fire
, Department 6-year plan; 3) October 26 - November 23 - Identify and review funding
solutions; 4) November 30 - December 14 - Make recommendations and complete,
report; and 5) January date to be announced - Commission presentation.,
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A line item budget for the Fire Department was requested.
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The next meeting is scheduled on October 12, 1999, at 3:00 p.m. at City
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ITEM #6 - Adiourn
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'The meeting adjourned at 5 :30 p.m. ,
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Chair
, Fire Task Force
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Board Reporter
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, Recently, there has been much debate regarding the needs of Clearwater
Firef.Rescue. Our Chief, the me~ia~ the city manager and the City Commission have
disseminated infonnation; it's time the firefighters had a say. This report is a voice from
, the Cleanvater Firefighters who have been most affected by years of oversight and
neglect.
This report is a historical compilation ofthe Clearwater Fire Department's
staffing and equipment over the' past 20 years. Enclosed are time lines on staffing cuts
and comparisons over 15 - 20 years; national averages of fire department staffing,
budgets and call volumes (*note reports of CFD calls since April 15, 1999 regarding
multiple alarm fires, vehicle accidents, helicopter transports, civilian and firefighter'
injuries); a division of labor chart to help foster understanding of some of the tasks
perfonned by different fire department companies at emergencies; a timeline on the
serious problems with one of our aerial trucks; an overview of fireground staffing,
standards and statistics; and a number of recent articles regarding the high rise fire
problem. This report is intended to assist in your understanding of the true concerns and
needs of this essential service to the citize!1s of Clearwater from a firefighter's
perspective.
Jim Canno
, Driver/Operator, A Shift
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Clearwater Fire/Rescue
Staffing Comparisons
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Line Personnel 1981 1985 1995 1999
Firefighters 120 114 117 112
Paramedic Lieutenants 12 12 0 0
Engine Co, Lieutenants 18 18 18 18
Truck Co. Lieutenants 0 0 0 3
Squad Co. Lieutenants 0 0 3 3
Firefighters I Lieutenants 150 144 138 136
Rescue Lieutenants (LR's) 0 0 3 3
Line Captains! District Chiefs 3 6 6 6
Total Line Personnel 153 150 147 145
Administrative Staff 1981 1985 1995 1999
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Admin. District Chiefs 0 0 0 1
ChIef 1 1 1 1
AssIstant Chiefs 2 1 1 1
Admin Asst. 0 1 1 1
Fire Marshal 1 1 1 1
Assistant Fire Marshal 0 0 0 0
Deouty Chief - Operations 0 0 0 1
Deputy Chief - EMS 0 1 1 1
Deouty Chief - Em. Mgml. 0 0 0 1
Deputy Chief - Support 0 0 0 1
Deputy Chief - Training 0 1 1 1
Asst. Chief of Training 0 0 0 1
Total Administrative Staff 4 6 6
Training 1981 1985
Training Ca tain
Training Lieutenants
Training Total
Prevention 1981 1985 1995 1999
Fire Dls atcher 5 0 0 0
Lead Inspector 1 0 0 0
Fire Inspectors (sworn) 6 3 1 1
Life Safet Officers (non-sworn) 0 2 4 4
Prevention Total 12 5 5 5
Support Personnel 1981 1985 1995 1999
Mechanics 3 3 3 3
Secretaries 3 3 3 4
Sloreskeeoer 1 1 1 1
Public Education 0 0 1 1.5
Fire Interns 0 0 0 1
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Support Personel Total
Total Personnel
7
7
8
10.5
179
169
166
171.5
Created: 6128/1999
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BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
() lMlaSJOMiN
'.~'-'OeRT B. STEWAAT . CHAlJU.Wf
BRUCE TYNOAU. . VICe! CWJfUMH
8AWE PARKa
STEVE SEIBERT
BAA8ARA SkEEN TODD
EMS AND FIRE ADMINISTRATION
U~PO UlMERTON ROAD
LARGO, FLORIDA 33174
PHONE: (at3) 682<2000
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May 7. 1997
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,," MAY 1 3 1997
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Fire ClUef Robert Davidson
Clearwater Fire Department
610 Franklin Street
Clearwater* FL 34616
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Dear Bob:
The Pinellas County Planning Department maintains 12 Planning Sectors Countrywide.' The Clearwater City and
County Fire District boundaries are the same and are listed as Sector 6. Therefore. we can easily provide the data you
requested.
, The population data was updated Feb. 7, ) 995, and the projections run through the year 2030, r :
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(~~ 1995 2000 2005 2010 . : 2015 .2020 . 2025 .: ,2030
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PERMANENT ]3 ],026 135,655 138.655 140,641 141,923 142,752 143.286 143.630
SECTOR SEASONAL 5,737 5,953 6,095 ' 6,188 6,248 6.287 6.312 6,328
6 TOURIST 18,365 18,586 18,731 18,526 ]8.928 18.926 ] 8,953 18,970
TOTAL 155,]28 160.172 163,492 165,655 ]67,059 ]67.967 168,550 168,927
,
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As can be st?e~ your city/county population is now over 155.128 and is expected to be at 168.927 by 2030.
The leMA recommends 3 F.F. per 1000 population t but notes that the average is only 1.5 per J 000. The City of
Clearwater currently maintains 1 S4 fire fighting personnel or 1.0 fire fighters per 1000 population.
Please advise if I can be of further assistance.
.~~
Dwaine E. Booth
A:\0.S06?7B.L Tk
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per 1,000 Population
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Note: Clearwater Police and FIre Totals do not include part-time employees.
National Averages taken from International City Managers
Association, 1998.
Em 10 ees Per 1,000 Em 10 ees Po ulation
Clearwater Police Total 3.89 389 100,000
Clearwater Police Sworn 2.55 255 100,000
National Avera e Police 2.55
Clearwater Fire Total 1.21 170 . 140,000
Clearwater Fire Swam 1.11 156 140,000
National Avera e Fire 1.64
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* Population for Clearwater fire reflects all of Fire Control District. This Includes county areas seIVed
by Clearwater Fire/Rescue.
Population for Clearwater Police Includes only that population wIthin clly limits. CPD does not selVe
areas outsIde city limits.
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08/15/99 13:18 YAX 8134628362
CI.F.."""'ATER FI RJi ...... ST,.\4 9
CJTY POPUtA TtON STAFFING CALLS
Brld e ort. CT' ' 140.000 356 12.021
New Haven. CT 130.474 411 24.616
Ft. Lauderdale. FL 150.175 425 35.494
Miami Beach. FL 93.336 205 19.047
Savannah. GA 143.000 242 3.633
Rockford. IL 143.000 248 16.985
, Flint. MI 140.000 251 18.456
Ga , IN 130.000 260 30.832
Kansas 0.... . KS 142.654 367 17.589
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" AVERAGE: 134.737 20.3 276.5 21.968
CLEARWATER. Fl 140.000 11.7 147 21.500
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("'Firehouse" Magazine. Ju~e 1999)
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Critical Fire/Rescue Service Tasks
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Structural Fire
Rescue Company (CFD Staffln~: 2 persons)
Entry
Patient treatment
Search and rescue
Rehabilitation treatment
Engine Company (CFD Staffing: 3 persons)
Search and rescue
Water supply
Attack fire with hand lines
Deploy backup hose lines
Deploy exposure hose lines
Deploy protection hose lines (for rescuers/ventilation)
Truck Company (CFD Staffing: 2/3 persons)
(Aerial LadderlElevating plntfonn)
Search and rescue
Forcible Entry
Ventilation
Place elevated hose lines
Deploy ground ladders
Support engine crews
Salvage and overhaul '
Rescue Company
Assure patient/rescuer safety
Triage
Patient treatment
Patient packaging
Assist transport
Documentation
Squad Gompany
Extrication
Scene lighting
, Assist with patient care
Assist with engine tasks
Truck C~mpany
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Squad Company (CFD Staffing: 2 persons)
Assist with aU truck operations, plus:
, Utility, control
Supply electricityllighting
Supply air '
Vehicle Accident
Engine Company
Hazard abatement
Control traffic
Control fuel, oil, coolant spills
Disconnect vehicle batteries
Assist with patient care
Assist with extrication
Provide and protect medevac helicopter landing zone
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(Specialized Rescues)
Squad Company
Elevated high angle rope rescue
Confined space rescue
Trench/collapse rescue
Extrication
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CLEARWATER'APRIL 15TH THROUGH JULY 12T~, 1999
'~'IRE-REPORTS CODE 84: '~
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. FIRE-REPORTS CODE
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Mr. Roberto:
I have compiled some of the facts and concerns you requested in regard to our
conversation at the September meeting of Local 1158. I listened intently to your
introduction of plans and goals for the City of Clearwater and found your UOne City One
Futur~" to be positive and grandiose.
Many of my brother firefighters and myself are disillusioned by the lack of commitment
toward upgrading our badly neglected Fire Department. We all realize the importance of
economic development, growth and tourism to the City and it's fiscal health. Our concern
is that public safety and firefighter safety should carry priorities over some of the plans.
I have nearly 22 years of dedicated service to Clearwater. I 'have been fiustrated by years
of sacrifice by front-line firefighters in the name of funding deficits and budget cuts,
Firefighters fulfill the mission of the fire service by saving lives and protpcting property.
We feel that for our dedication we deserve reliable and modern equipment, as well as
staffing levels that enable us to perform our demanding jobs safely and professionally.
Many of these same concerns about staffing levels, equipment and safety are reflected in
the uFire Service Management Study;' (1998) by Richard Knopf and Associates. Ed
Hooper has voiced similar concerns in a letter to the union membership in the October,
November, December 1998 issue of the &'Professional Firefighter."
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,
Most of the Fire Department's problems stem from it's past administration's approach to
growth in development, population and more than a three-fold increase in emergency calls.
We have suffered from the uborrow from Peter to pay Paul" approach too long. All of this
has been at the expense of the personnel doing the job - Firefighters.
Enclosed is a brief twenty-year history of the Fire Department's staffing cuts and
dwindling promotional opportunities. Staffing problems are not new. In 1985, our
department cut six firefighter positions to create three additional District Chiefpositions.
That year the department responded to approximately 8000 calls. Now, fourteen years
later, an additional cut of3 frrefighters was made to maintain the 6 District Chief positions.
We now respond to 22,000 calls and have 9 fewer firefighters to answer them. I have
included a summary of a uI984 Dallas Staffing Level Study" that was presented to the Fire
Department administration in 1985. It highlights the staffing necessary to safely and
efficiently carry out critical fireground operations.
There have been added demands on fireground staffing levels above those necessary to
perform the most critical tasks during structural firefighting as demonstrated in the staffing
level study. For example, O.S.H.A. and the N.F.P.A. have mandated several new
requirements including a t~ in, 2 out" rule prior to commencement of interior fire
operations. Also, a dedicated safety officer, accountability officer and a rapid intervention
team are requirements. To fulfill these staffing requirements, we are committing half of
our available fire apparatus on each structure response. This' creates extended response
times for second calls, including EMS calls, in the subsequently unprotected areas.
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Our aging fire apparatus have become a critical problem in regard to safety and reliability.
I have provided an inventory of current vehicles. Some of these vehicles have outlived
their usefulness even for a reserve capacity, ,Their reliability is questionable and repairs
are time consuming because of the lack of available parts. The department has been forced
to borrow fire apparatus from the City of Largo because of our lack of serviceable vehicles.
Repainting has visually enhanced our fire trucks~ but under the shiny orange and white
paint are tired metal~ outdated braking systemst leaky pumps and worn out suspensions and
drive trains. Firefighters rely on this equipment to carry them 100 feet into the air or to
supply water to fire hoses as they crawl through burning buildings while carrying out their
mission. The day of accountability will come and when it does, what value is the city
w~11ing to place on a life?
ClOne City, One Futurc.tt For us to progress to the futuret we need to cOrrect the ills of the
past as they pertain to the Fire Department. '
'.'
Th~nk yoti for the opportunity to express some of the concerns of those most directly
affected, the people doing the job and risking their lives, the firefighters.
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Sincerely,
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Vincent J. Carino
Firefighter
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Copies to:
CommIssion
Press
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Date NOV 26 1984
MEMORANDUM
Cltv Attorney
City Clerk
TO:
The City Commission ~
Anthony L. Shoemake~,_C1~~ge~~
Fire Chief Davidson, ~p Kroeger
FROM:
COPIES:
SUBJECT: F1~e Department Reorg~niz~tion
--- ~.~..,
DATE:
November 21, 1984
There haa been a great deal ~f discussion regarding the reorganization
which has taken place within the Fire Department. I am forwarding to
you another memorandum which clearlyoutlineo the reorganization and
: ,assignment of duties as proposed by the Fire ciiief' and approved by me.
. It should be noted that not only vill theTe be better management control,
the reorganization is projected to save $36,634.
.
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TO:
FROM:
Tony Shoemaker, City Manager
Bob Davidson. Fire Chief ~~~'~
100crut:pdllmelll ~(jrr~~ponUl:nce .,Heel
COPIES:
n JECT: Fire Department Reorganization
DATE: November 8. 1984,
(~)
1.c;;~,
The present organizational structure of the Fire Department is basically
the same as it was thirty year~ ago. This basic line/staff organiza-
tional structure served the basic delivery of emergency services.
However, the Fire Department today has to face an entirely different
situation because of growth, population increase, federal. state and
county legislation, and a commitment by all fire depar~ents to educate
the publi~ in fire safety procedures, and life saving techniques.
The changes in our organizational chart basically involve four positions
and the rewriting of the job description for thos~ positions.
Assistant Fire Chief- This position will be vacated in early 1985
by retirement. The civilian position of administrative assistant will
perform budgetary, financial and research duties. Salary ,saving is
approximately 50S.
Deputy Fire Chief - This position was funded in the 1982/83 budget.
This uniformed officer coordinates the emergency activities between the
three shifts and handles communications from administration through the
chain of command. This officer works five days a week. Shift personnel
work ten days a month. This position was funded by eliminating the
captain assigned to training.
District Captains - Presently. we have three captains who are the
"shift cOjTJ11anderll for either A, B, or C shift. The re-structuring of
the Fire Department to an East/West District organization will reduce
the shift commanders' responsibility down to thr~e stations and 25
personnel instead of six stations and 50 personnel. This district
structure 1s very important for emergency and administrative situations
that arise in our East and Northeast sections. These six district
captains will be 24-hour shift personnel, unifonned and assigned to
their respective district. Their responsibilities will be to command
fire and E.M.S. emergencies as they arise in their district. Manage-
ment of administrative duties for their 25 assigned firefighters is
also their responsibility. Funding will be cost savings in the assistant
fire chief position and not filling three of the present firefighter
vacancies.
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CLEARWATER TAMPA ST. PETERSBURG
UNIT MANPOWER UNIT ' MANPOWER UNIT MANPOWER
ENGINE 11 ENGINE 4 ENGINE 4-
ENGINE 3 ENGINE 4 ENGINE 3....
RESCUE 3 RESCUE t RESCUE 2.....
TRUCK ' . 2 TRUCK TRUCK 3....
SQUAD/PUHPER 2 . . LIGHT T. ,....
COMMAND 1 COMMAND 1 COMMAND 1-
TOTAL 15 TOTAL 1~ t TOTAL
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I of Tampa~ St. Peter~burg and Clearwater. The 11~ted equipment
and manpower 15 a typical response for a reported structure tire.
The manpower, listed bel~wJ 1s the routine manpower round on each
unit and allows for personnel to be off duty, on vaot16n and sick
time. Should no personnel be oft duty, the manpower ot'each unit
would be increased from that listed below. The Clearwater
, manpower reflects current changes made due to the department's
restructurIns. which was approved 1n the '98~/85 budget.
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The fOllowinG information 1s a cost comparison or the current
'restructuring program tor 'the Clearwater Fire Department. Job
titles under "Old Structure" have been eliminated and replaced
with job titles under "New Struoture".
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New Structure
Asst Fire Har3hal
$"70 Bi/weekly
Training/Public Relations
$626 8i/weekl
Old Structure
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Captains (3)
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Si/weekly
Lead Inspector
$11q6 Si/weekly
leutenant 1n Training
$918 Bi/weekly
~s~is~nt~lre ~1ef '
$ "ij 6SJ B1..lWeek+f '-
Flreflghter~ (6).
$651 x 6 = $3906
Bi/weekly,
Headquarters Assignment
Pay $150 Si/weekly
,TOTAL BI/WEEKLY COST
$ 7885
TOTAL YEARLY COST
$ 205,010
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TOTALBI/WEEKLy'COST
$ 6~76
TOTAL YEARLY COST
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$ 168,376
$ 36,63Q
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HEW STRUCTURE
YEARLY SAVINGS
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, ~ning Can.
1985
I.o:::al 1158
Purpose
It is the dedication to the protection of lives and prcpe.rty of the
, citizens of the City of Clearwater and provide for the safety of
the fire fighters protecting them.
The ccmnittee was established due to the decrease in, on duty line
fire fighters Ol& the past seven years and the Olerwhelminq grCMth
in res idential, m.1l ti -family apartIrent aOO. coodaninium caIt?lexes,
coogregate care and nursing hare facilities, and high rise develc:p-
ttent.. . ~
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It is the con::erns of the fire fighters, fire fighte.r/parcsrecH c:s ,
and officers of the Clearwater Fire Oeparbnent that inaiequate
staffing leveln (Xl fire apparatus jecpardizes the safety of t..hP.
citizens of Clea..n.ater and the firefighters protecting them.
Staffing levels are a1~o inadequate to effectively protect the
prcperties and pe.r60naJ belongiD;s of our citizens and businesses
alike. \
\
Rather than ask for an expensive study of present fire fighting
capabilities, Local 1158 has obtained a copy of the r.a11as Fire
Oepartrrent Staffing Level Study. ~is Gtudy was prepared by
K:Manis Associates and John T. O'Hagan and associate:s in
coojunction with the Dallas Fire Department for Fire Chief to:1d
Miller. The manageaent and research ccnsu1tants are irXlepezrlent of
any fire depa.rtIIent cr union. '!he report was received by the
Dallas Fire DepartIrent in June of 1984.
"The p..1rpcse of the report was to evaluate the effects of vary i.nq
the staffing levels en fire, apparatus. It was not intended to make
specific reccmmndations CXl staffing levels for adoption by the
Dallas Fire Departlrent.. Ag report..ed in Fire Carm3..nd, June 1985 by
Da.llaS Assistant O1ief Mi.ke Freanan, -'!he study in retrospect, two
points are worthy of note. First, the sbJdy offered the Dallas
Fire OepartJrent and hopefully the fire service in general an
cpportunity to take an cbjective, critical look at fire carpany
ef feeti veness. Se:coOO, it provides the Fire Depa..rt:rrent wi th
scenarios in \lihich current policies, procedures, and practires
cculd be evaluated..
The Dallas study is an evaluation of the staffing levelS for fire
carpany crews involves careful analysis of the effects of reducing
staff, in tel:ms of accarplishing the cbjectives of fire control.
Saving lives and prcperty aOO a::3a::}uate safety precautiOlS for the
fire control staff.
(;)
To c:btain valid d3.ta 00 the different crfM sizes to nanage CUlllk')C1
fire situatioos, 91 simJlaticns were cax1ucted, using in every
aim..1l.ation, crews CUI~ of five, feur, or three firefighters.
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'lMse were engine and truck carpanies, note truck carpany indicates
a high rise apparatus and crew. These wre actual fire fighting
carp!J1ies, E.M. S. units and maJ1pcMer squads were not included in
study, althcugh they are a part of fire respcnse.
In each of these tests, particular events ~e identified, which
were critical to the success of the cpe.ratioo. 'lbese includedz
rescuing trapped victims, placing a hose line into operation, an:!
providing c:penitY:Js to relieve a ooilding of hea.t and tax:ic gases.
Times for carpleting these tasks were recorded to ca:rpare the
effectiveness of the different size crews. ~ times serve
several pn-poses inclming:
1) Demonstrate the penal! t.es or benefits 8Sscc!at.ed with
chan;es in crfM size, in terns rBlUired to pe.rf01ll'l
critical task!..
2) AHCM correlation of perfoorence tines with predictable
fire growth as projected by the standard tine tarpera ture
curve. *
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3) Allcw an evaluation of the effectiveness of the life
saving functions by carpa.ring search and ventilatioo t..irres
with projections of survival times for the wilding
cccupants .
TOO findings indicate that a direct correlation exists l:etween
staffing level an::1 perfoonance quality.
Staffing reducticns b!yocrl the level that is necessary to
acccnplish the ~t critical tasks within a limited t1lre frarre
dictated by a rapidly develcping fire can J:e co..mter prc:rluct.ive.
, As a general rule, the study indicates a staffing belCM a crfM size
of fall" can aJer tax the operating force and lead to higher losses.
It was also reco)'nize:3. that in sare strategies eaplcyed during
these sinulations, a fcur person crfM ~ taxed beyord its limits
and that a five perSCX1 crew wa.11d have beer. more apprc:priate.
Tbg stooy fa.md the simulations demonstrated ~dequate staffing
results in the following problems: '
*Timas ~e catparable with results cbtained by the National Fire
Mninistraticn in private residential test9, am Brooklyn
Polytechnic Institute in full scale high rise office fire test.
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1) r:elays in performance of critical tasks.
2) Increased risk to victirrs because of length of delays
increased, the likelihocd of survival decreases.
)) Loss of crit~c:al functioo.
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4) A currulative effect created by ccrnbined delays and lest
functioos on ~ part of each cr~ resulting in an even
greater O/er811 loss of effectiveness.
5) Increased physiological stress (Xl fire fighters as they
try to c::o'lpf"tlSa te for the 10tler stat fing level.
6) Increased risk to the fire fighter when ~gTessive
procedures are undertaken withaJ.t the support necessary
to carplete them safely.
TIE 91 scenaric:s used test fires in two story frane residential,
b.\:) story apart:rcent b.1ilding,' and a nine story office high rise.
All <?f which are fcund in D'Ulititooe in the City of Clearwater.
The staffillg' study calclusioos are as follC1tll'S:
1 ) Apartment haJse sim11a ticn
Engine Carpany - No less than four fire fighters
Truck Catpany - No less ~ five fire fighters
2) Biqhrise office sinulaticn
A staffing level of five walld t:e desirable for fire
carpanieS re5{:OOding to this carplexi ty and magni tude.
Crew9 of three suffer fran too great a less of function
a.OO capacity.
Private residential
3) Five person crews demonstrated a more coordinated and
effective attack Cl1 the fire, search and rescue
cperation.
FC11%' person creM was capable of perfoming
satisfactorily in caltrolling the fire and in effecting
the rescue operation. ,
Three person crews were able to control the fire althOlgh
they were unable to caTq?lete the search of the 'la.oJer level
until the fire was extinguished. At this staffing level
there was little IIBrgin for error arx3 any appreciable
delay in arrival might place the control of the fire
beyond their capability. \
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An analysis of the staffing of a fire ccrcpany iINolves mxe than
entimating the benefits of adding another person to tho crew. It.
requires an undarstardinq of the system that. has been designed. to
provide fire protection ard hCM it is supposed to func:tioo. '!be
met critical factor in the fire protection equatioo is time. '!be.
irlpOrtance of tJ.m! is related to the eKpOneJltial develqment of
fire. The tOOSt iuportant tine seq:nent in history of a particular
fire is between when it starts and when it is discovered. The
second nr;st critical tilre, seg:Jant in the history of a .fire is the
t:iJm bebeen the receipt of tm fire a1Bnn and tba arrival of the
fire cSepart:msnt. Processing the alaan, reaction of the fire crews,
travel tim, which can be influenced by traffic, road oondltions,
street arrangsnent8, ~4phy, natural and man nade cbstacles,
aId eccura.c:v of the reported fire, can all affect this value.
A\rerage response tima feY: the first engine ca1l?MY is usually five
minutes or less, and for truck carpany seven minutes or less. 'I11e
need for cne fire CXI1pany, either engine or b:uck at the scene of a
fire, beoausa of the nature of the risJc, .affect the deploymmt and
spacing of ccapanies. 'lba ~ c:i catpanies assigned to respond
in related to t:.IE number general..ly required to handle the most
snriOJS fire likely to be eJ1CXK1Jltered in t:mse luildings. rnna
8nsigment. is without depriving oo.jacent areas of reasonable
protection during the t..im9 the incident is in pr031'ess.
f~~_ G~~ the expoMnthe "" ,:,81 grCMth r~tP; of fires, there are obviOUSi
'.....- l~w.ts to ~c that an additialal ca:npany can take to arr ve
and still be effective. If correct analysis and. planning is
foll~, this initial assignrent of OOlpBnies shadd ba able to
cootain all b.1t a very snall percentage of the fires that cx:cur in
the area. If this is not the case and experience sha.E that
m.lltiple alantB are re:;tUired fre::;IUent.l.y, then the planning is
fu.ulty, and the alze of the response IrIlSt be exam.irH;d.
1he Dallas Staffing Le,:,e1 Study. was so convincing that: the Dallas
fire Department IS-hfrUlg 133 fLre fighters CNer the next:. three
yr.ara, as reported in Fire Cc:mnard IM.g&zina, JUne 1985. The. study
in so pervasive that Fire Ccrrrnand has feab.1red it in its magazine
for t:hs past seven ncnths. The s'b1dy is much in line with the
p1~oblems faced by Cleaz:wat:er Fire F1ghtera.
It is the desire of the me:nbera of the Clearwater Fire Depart:rDent
to adequately staff fire apparatus to effectively provide
prot:ect.iOD to the public a1Xl safety to those who provide this
protect.!on. We are asking for staffing levels to prcwide effective
first alal:m response and allaor far reliable back up crews in case
of major fires. 'l\U,s wa1ld provide the support needed to fight
fires safely, cover all critical tasks aiding victims a.rxi fire
.fighters and reduce fire damage thrcugh effective fire fighting.
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1979
4 ALS Rescues, eacb wflb:
Maximum Staffing:
3 - Paramedics
1- Lieutenant
1 - Biomedic
1 - Paramedic
Minimum Staffing:
2 - Paramedics
1 - Lieutenant
1 - Biomedic
1 - EMTIFircfightcr ,
Totals per shift:
Max: 12 - Paramedics
Min: 8 - Paramedics
4 - EMTlFirefighters '
Rescue Staffing Comparison
1999
6 ALS RescUCf. each wlCh:
Maximum Staffing:
2 - Paramedics
1 - Lead Medic
1 - Paramedic
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Minimum Staffing:
1 - Paramedic
I - EMT
Max: 12 - Paramedics
Min: 6 - Paramedics
6 - EMTlFirefighfers
.. If we had maintained the unil staffing profile of 1979. our current total staffing of rescues would ~ as . :'
fonows: ,
6 LieutenantIParamedics
6 Biomedics
6 Paramedics
18 Paramedics per shift
I
Based on unit staffing levels in 1979. the fire department has realized a loss of 18 LieutenanVParamedic '
positions. 18 Bjomedic positions and 18 Paramedics positions.
In 1979. these assignments received upremium pay," Paramedics received 15% over base pay. which
included Lieulenanls. Biomedics received 11-1/2% over base. and EMT's received 5% over base pay.
Note also that Lieulenants were eligible for further promotion. whereas Leadmedic are not (without
leaving EMS).
A Lieutenant of Rescue (LR) position. one per shift, was created several years ago. This was a lateral
, transfer of a Lieutenant position from training.
Comparison of Fire Apparatus Assignments
1979 versus 1999
" '
1979 1999
6 Engines 6
1-2* Pumpers 0
3 Trucks 1-2**
1 Truck Tender 0
1 Squad 1
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.-The administration has considered eliminating 1 truck
Our current apparatus assignments have resulted in a loss of 12-1 g driver/operator positions department-
wide.
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This configuration has also resulted in a decrease of response personnel at station 46 (beach) from 9 to S-
6 (depending on engine staffing). This has been a result of eliminating th,e truck (2 drivers - tTactor/tiller)
. and 1 Jess paramedic on'R46.
, ,
Line Staffing Conlparison (per shift)
1979'
SO Firefighters/Officers
1 Captain
1999
47 Firefighters/Officers
2 District Chiefs
This reflects a Joss of 9 line firefighter positions department-wide.
Inspection Division Staffing Comparison
The department has worked to "civilianizen the inspection division through attrition. This has resulted in
a loss of 6 Fire Inspector positions; which were Lieutenant-grade promotions. These positions have been
replaced with uLife-Safety Officers;; whid. are non-fire certified personnel.
Th~re has been no increase in personnel in spite of the growth of the City of Clearwater since 1979.
1979
Chief
Assistaqt Chief
Assistant Chief
, Fire Marshal
Administrative St~ffing Comparison
1999*
Chief
Assistant Chief
Administrative Assistant
Deputy Chief - Operations
Deputy Chief - EMS
Deputy Chief - Training
Deputy Chief - Emergency Management
Assistant Chief of Training
District Chief (rotates from line to admin.)
Support Staff:
2 - Secretari~
2 - Mechanics
o - Supply,
o - Public Education
3 - Secretaries
1 - Mechanic Supervisor
2 .:. Mechanics
1 - Supply
1 - Fire Intern (part-time)
1 - Public Education (Full-time)
1 - Public Education (part-time. proposed)
· Current as of this date. Subject to change.
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IMPACT OF STAFFING AND EOUIPMENT CUTS
, , :Q l?
?:'t~ 1979-1999
..' DECREASING LEVELS OF SERVICE
..
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'1979 Staffing 6 Stntions 50 Firefighters and Lts.
7 Engines (ine P-45) Per shift-3 shifts
2 Trucks 150 Total
" , 4 Rescues 3 Captains
I Captain
1980 SLaffing is Stations 50 Firefighters and Us.
7 Engines Per Shift-3 Shifts
3 TruckS 150 Total
4 Rescues 3 Captains
I Squad
I Captain
1985, Staffing 6 Stations 48 Firefighters and Lts.
7 Engines (inc P-45) Per Shift-3 Shifts
3 Trucks 144 Total
6 Rescues 6 DC's
0 I Squad
, , " 2 District Chiefs
1988 Staffing ~ Stations 48 Firefighters and Us.
5 Engines-Cut P-45 Per Shill-3 Shifts
2 Trucks 144 TOlal
'6 Rescues 6 DC's
1 Squad
I Quint (Ladder truck ,lith pump 5ta. 46)
2 District Chiefs
; 1995 Staffing 6 Stations 47 Firefighters and Lts.
6 Engines (Beach Engine WiUl 7S'Ladder;not a Quint)
, 2 Trucks 138 Firefighters and Lts. 3 Shifts
6 Rescues 3 LR's
1 Squad 6 DC's
1 LR
2 District Chiefs
:
1999 Staffing 6 Stations 136 Firefighters
6 Engines 3 LR's
2 Truckc; 7DC's
6 Rescues
0 1 Squad
1 LR
,I ' 2 District Chiefs
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, Loss of 14 Firefighters SUlffing Fire ApJXll'3tus
Station 4S siaffinr ~!t from 14 to 9
Station 46 (Beach) "Stamng cut from 8/9 to S
Station'47 Staffing increased 2 R-47
Station 48 . Staffing ulcreased 2 R-48
Station 49 Staffing increased 2 S-49
Staffing borrowed from West side of city to increase gro\\ing East side leaving response to Beach
~gerously low~ ' High rise require 24 Firefighters and 2 Chief Officers early in the incident
, ,: Rescue Truck staffing cUt from 3 Paramedics to 2 Paramedics in order to staff 2 additional rescue trucks
due to increase in call volume.
Station 46 (Beach) Equipment Cuts
1980 Transport capable rescue truck
100' Ladder truck \\ith 208' ground ladders
Engine ~i11148' ground ladders
"
1988 Transport G1pable Rescue ,
8S' Ladder ptatfonn \\ith 16S' ground ladders
(Quint)
1992 Non Transport Capable Rescue
7S'Ladder on engine with 48' ground ladders
1984 Cut 6 Firefighters to add 3 District Chiefs
1985 Began cutting transport capable rescue trucks
Cut P-45
Cut 3 Firefighters off engines to stlff 3 LR positions
.,
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1988 Borrowed monies from Ladder Truck Fund to purchase 3 NFPA compliant engines
1993 Borrowed equipm:nt from other Departments in attempt to enhance ISO rating
1995 Cut 3 Firefighters to maintain 6 Des
1999' Cut 2 Firefighters to add J Deput)' Chief and 1 District Chief
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Comparison of Responsibilities
Our call volume bas Increased Crom 6000 runs In 1979 to 22,000+ runs In 1998.
Entry Requirements:
In 1979, the requirements for entry into the Fire Department were a HS diploma or GED, successful
completion of a writ1en and physical fitness test. The city then would provide for Fire Academy
training and Paramedic training.
Currently, in addition to the 1979 requirements. since the department no longer provides for the initial
training for farClighter certification, the prospective employee must obtain, at his cost, Fire Academy
training, EMT training and Paramedic training.
Current Training Requirements:
2 hrs. per day in-house training, minimum
BiaMual CPR Certification
BiaMual ACLS recertification for paramedics
BiaMual BTI.S recertification for paramedics
Monthly Continuing Medical Training for EMrs and Paramedics
HIVmm training
Right to Know training
.12 Dives per year (off duty) for Dive team members plus annual testing
6 off'-duty/6 on-duty training evolutions/year for Technical Rescue team members plus annual testing
Added Responsibilities since 1979:
Mandated non-smoking clause for employees hired after 1985
Must maintain EMT certification for employees after 1985
Hydrant testing
Pool Safety
Smoke detector installation
Hose maintenance
Lock Box maintenance
Air pack maintenance
Dive Team
Water Rescue Team
Technical Rescue Team:
Elevated Rescue
Confined Space Rescue
Trench Rescue
Swat Medics
Bike Medic/Special Events Team
FirelEMS reporting - Computer Check - enter
Sllpervise ExpJorer Post
Emergency Management
Vehicle Setup/Compartmentation modifications
Vehick' Specifications
Automatic Mutual Aid to neighboring fire departments
Confined Space awareness training for city employees
CPR training for city employees '
Inoculations for city employees
Assist with Helicopter transport
ALS engines
Confined space preplans for city facilities
12-lead EKG for patients
Automatic Defibrillators
Equipment Calibration - high tech.
NFP A 1 SOO requirements
'We have also fielded 2 competition teams - Extrication and Clincon
.' , Equipment
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. .-'
45 46 47 48 49 50
Engine 1989 1992 1975 1991 1990 1972
53,000 mi 25.900 mt 125,200 mi 61,000 mi 58,000 mi 89.100 mi
Truck 1988 1979/1995
5 1,000 mi 14,500 mi
Squad 1997
9.000 mi
Rescue 1992 1992 1995 1995 1992 1989
75,000 mi 50.900 mi 38,000 mi 55,800 mi 89,000 mi 89,000 mi
Reserve:
EngIne 1987 1966
58,000 mi 97.000 mi
Truck
Squad 1979
135,000 mi
Rescues 1984 1986
157,000 mi 109,000 mi
Other M45/1984
Units 189,700 mi'
Vehicles that do not meet Enclosed Cab Standards - 1988
E47 Maxim
\ ESO Maxim
J T45 (Sutphen) .-.
"'-/
P47 Ford Commercial Chassis
PSO Pirsch
Any vehicles older than 1984 do not meet ground ladder standards (safety).
o
1972, 1974 Maxims, Simon snorkel, Pirsch
Unreliable
Parts arc unavailable resulting in time consuming repairs
Poor braking
Auxiliary Braking -latest standards call for it on apparatus. Currently, only E46 has auxiliary
braking. .
Seating Areas
Great amount oCheat from engine as well as environment resulting in heat stress
Excessive noise - resulting in hearing loss
Lack of protection from elements, both natural and civil
No protection from fumes
Compartmcntation
Inadequate to contain current and future equipment needs
.Lack oflocking compartments - required by state for securing narcotics (ALS Engines)
Breathing apparatus deployment delays
These vehicles were "refurbished"
What was actually done was to repaint them and upgrade emergency lighting
No significant mechanical work was done on any of the vehicle except the Simon
The Simon has been hampered by continual mechanical problems since it feU, even after
it was urefurbished,to These also include failure of supporting jacks (the cause of the fall) .
and signs of metal fatigue.
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l\1orale
Moratc ~ontinues to dedine for many reasons, some ,of which arc:
Promotional Exams
20 year history of being delayed'
By contract and by rule, exams are to be administered every 2 years
the most recent'Lieutenant exam was 1 year beyond this date
. the most recent Drivers lest was 2 years beyond this date
Creates many acting positions nt all levels resulli!l8 in:
Decreased ability to plan
D~creased ability to implement new ideas
Decreased effectiveness
, [)ccreased discipline
Decreased Safety ,
Decreased morale
. Decreas~d benefits
, ,Bouom offwlding priorities:
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, Higher Morale c'quates to:
, More productivity
c More cooperation c
, More dedication
. More progressive atmosphere
Higher quality customer, service ,
Less :>tress '
Less sick leave use '
Improved corrununication
Less confrontation '
Improved labor/management relations
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Tonight at approximately 6:45 PM the Clearwater City Commission took the first step
towards our new beginning. On the I{consent" portion of the agenda under item #18,
was a request to approve the purchase of FIVE new engines. It passed unanimously.
. This represents a huge commitment on the part of the City to bring our fleet of
apparatu.s up to a standard that cannot be matched by any other department in the
countY. Provided that all the manufacturers are able t meet the production schedules
, in place, we will take delivery of five engines along with the five rescue units already
on order by Dece\nber of next year. This $2~2 million expenditure is part of our
apparatus replacement plan and is designed to prevent our current situation from ever
occurring again. We will also begin the process of drawing up specifications for the '
replacement' of the 1979 Simon aerial and anticipate delivery in October of 2000.
i-) I CLEARWATER FIRE & RESCUE *
'. ~,,:i'
Administration Division
, ,
To: All Personnel
, ,
, From: ' Rowland Herald, Fire Chief
, 'Subject: Our beginning
" December lOt 1998
Date:
o
More importantly however, tonighes vote represents a commitment to you. I hope
this serves as tangible proof to each of you that this Commission, the City Manager,
and this administration are dedicated to providing you with the tools and support
necessary to allow for your success while you provide for the public safety. It is also
important to recognize that this extraordinary accomplishment would not have been
possible without the help of several dedicated personnel, Loca11158, and our Safety
and Employee Development division. I owe all of them my thanks. This is only the
beginning of what I hope will be many advances in not only apparatus, but facilities,
personnel support issues, and the integration of technology into our service. res very
probable that we will not realize our full potential quickly enough to suit our desires,
but I believe the journey has begun.
One City. One' Future.
., ....~ ....,~... r
,0 Vehicle # 1240.35
. City ID # 0252
Date: 09/24/1992
Incident #280588
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Emergency One Simon Snorkel
On September 24, 1992, at 1150 Cleveland Street, Clearwater, FL, there was a fire call - possible
structure fire. The Simon Snorkel was backed into the Barnett Bank over the outside drive-in tellers
and was set up to go to the roofto go check the AC units, While the vehicle was being raised, the
passenger side outriggers had a catastrophic hydraulic failure and the boom and bucket fell into the
building with two firefighters in the bucket.
C lemv..alm flrcfigtlt(1rS
were shaken but unin-
jured Thursday whem a boom
wIth firefighters in it suddenly
lelt 6 tc IJ feet during a call at
the Barnett Sank Building, '
1150 ClevelamJ 8t.
Above, fire ofllcials examine
tho damage the boom's fall
causad. tOtll0 building,
Right, lirefighlars make stlro
the firo engine is balanced be-
fore the boom is lowered with
the help 01 an auxiliary system.
Fira equipment falters
I' . .. " "". ..' ",.
Date: 10/03/92
~ Truck 45 was transported to Pennsylvania to L TI for hydraulic repairs after fall in 09/24/1992.
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After hydraulic work at LTl the vehicle would be taken to New York State to have the cab and high
side compartments put on by Salisbury and then returned to Clearwater. There was a problem with the
cab because of the boom and there were modifications made to the cab so the boom would fit down
inside. The diesel engine that it left with had 37,000 miles on it and for some reason, it and the
transmission were replaced with new ones. The vehicle was finally ready to be brought back in
November 1994. On its way back from Salisbury, one of the jacks crept out and the vehicle was taken
back to L TI in Pennsylvania. At that time the aerial was set up and extended and they were not able to
bring the aerial down by normal means. It was len there until December when it was brought back
to Clearwater. It had been gone over two years.
u
Over the next six months, firefighters and shop personnel worked to get this vehicle in service, Wiring
was not right, there were still hydrauiic leaks, the jacks still drifted, lights didn't come on when their
switches were turned on. The doors were held on by only a few screws and the interior of the cab was
extremely hot. The reason for this was that the rear AC did not seem to be working. When the box
was opened, we found there was no rear AC, that it was just fans. Salisbury was called, and their
answer was, it didn't need a rear AC. But they still charged us tor it. Now we had to have it taken to
Tampa where a rear AC was installed. Things seemed to go down hill from there. On June 16, 1995,
the vehicle finally went back in service however, many more repairs continued to be needed. The
chart below lists them:
7.
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Date Repair needed Days out
of service
06119/95 Radio, siren and air horns were repaired and the dog house scaled 1
06/23/95 Spotlight repaired .5
06/23/95 @ 1430 hours, vehicle taken out of service by Chief Mechanic Whitehead 30
because the jacks had rctracted on passenger side, which was the same side that
had malfunctioned in 1992. Whitchead called L Tl and they said there would be
a hydraulic man from L TI in Clearwatcr on Monday the 261h. While hydraulic
cylinders were rebuilt and the interlock was fixed. At this time we found out
that L TI, because of personnel leaving, had never touched the hydraulic system,
but had charged us $47,000 for rcpairs they never started.
08/14/95 Leak on the right rear jack was repaired I
08/17/95 A leak had been noticed on the right front jack, and vehicle was put out of 1
service to have the hydraulic check valves checked.
08/26/95 Siren control modules repaired I
08/30/95 Panels on the rear of the truck had to be replaced. I
09/14/95 Generator repaired. 1
09/22/95 Left air horn fell off on the way back from a call and needed to be fixed .25
11/04/95 Left rear jack pad drifting down at rest was noticed - no repair done at this time 0
11/28/95 Handrail outside the bucket welds broke - was repaired the same day .25
11/28/95 Right rear spotlight on bucket broke - no repair done at this time 0
12/04/95 Mirror on left side broken and repaired same day .25
02/05/96 Shop replaced air brake diaphragm on rear of truck to stop air leaks .5
02/26/96 Nomlal service and brake repair 3
04;03/96 Right front jack repaired at Atlas Hydrnulic 1.5
04/20/96 Left center compartment door didn't latch completely, needed to be repaired .25
05/0 I 196 As per CL 1 00, nobody in bucket for aerial operations until we hear from Simon 2
UK re: cracks in number 3 boom. Boom was out of service. On 05/03/96 cracks
welded and boom was placed back in service
OS/24/96 Interlock safely guards do not go all the way down when the boom is in the up 1
position. On OS/25/96 they were tested and certified OK.
05/29/96 Taken to Heller Transmission for estimate on PTO. Hydraulic line for auxiliary . I
system was broken and repaired by the shop
05/30/96 Hydraulic fluid cleaned by shop - 4 gal. Added .5
06/02/96 PTO repair 5
06/13/96 Transmission fluid added, transmission filter tightened .5
06/17/96 High speed throttle in bucket repaired .5
07/01/96 Monis factory representative came to check operations 4
07/08/96 Shop attempted to correct outrigger creeping by installing new valve - problem 2
still prevails. Wrong valve was installed per Morris.
07/10/96 Shop fixed leak in transmission filter cnn .25
07/12/96 Installed different valve in outrigger - problem still exists .5
07/18/96 Cannot get interlock - truck not out of service 0
07/24/96 Shop adjusted pressure settings for interlock functions .25
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Date Repair needed Days out
of service
07/26/96 Light bars don't work - not out of service 0
07/29/96 Replaced relay for the light bars. .25
08/13/96 Oil pressure light stays on - shop says OK to drive - no service 0
09/04/96 Boom bedding control tixed .2S
09/18196 Compartment door warning lights malfunctioning - no service 0
10/04/96 Generator repaired .25
11/02/96 Right rear jack did not want to relract - eventually did - no service 0
11/27/96 Shop repaired roll up doors, leak at tube on outrigger 1
01/13/97 Altemator repaired 1
02/01/97 Oil leak - oil filter found loose and was tightened and oil added .25
02/20/97 Radio shop fixed intercom in bucket .25
02/27/97 Shop trying to find fluid leaks - found broken oil line 1
04/16/97 PIO not working - engine light comes on at high idle 0
06/11/97 Flood lights under bucket repaired .25
06/25/97 Hydraulic still leaking I
07/28/97 Hydraulic cylinders repaired 1
10/30/97 Rclief\'alve broken on waterv/ay & cracks found in 3l'l1 boom 1
11/04/97 Hydraulic fluid puddle under rear pedestal 0
01/12/98 Compressed air regulator fixed .25
01/13/98 Work on battery switch .25
01/21/98 Speedometer doesn't work, speaker in bucket doesn't receive, right rear 0
outrigger leaking
01/28/98 Fixed front breaks 1
02/27/98 35 foot ladder failed test - taken out of service
03/23/98 Rear spotlight fell off - fixed .25
04/21/98 Hydraulic cylinder repair and replacement 114
to
08/15/98
08/18/98 Small hydraulic leak on left rear outrigger 0
08/19/98 To Atlas Hydraulics - turntable rotation problem - interlock lost during training 11?
with boom - left outrigger drifted about 3 inches.
08/21/98 Overhead lights out 0
09/1li98 Speedometer not working, compartment open light flashing, strange noise .5
coming from hydraulics after extending the jacks
10/03/98 Cracks wcre detected in bucket & right rear outrigg_er leaking hydraulic fluid I
10/06/98 Truck out of service - stnJctural 30
10/06/98 Aerial out of service unti I further notice - structural problems with bucket - As of
07/11/99 aerial still out of servicc
11/30i98 Generator turns over but will not start 0
01/16/99 Truck out of service - structural damage to the bucket - being measured and 13
.
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06/0 1/99
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Repair needed
pictures taken.
Outer safety bar on bucket broken M it was then taken off
Truck out of service for repairs to the bucket & aerial boom to be checked by
UK engineer Mas of07/lli99 still out of service.
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drorts, ovcrWhcimlngly
Ins . 10 cent per capita
se for the FlREPAC
lion Fund.
increase in political action
~.i.U.,"able the lAFF to fur-
l i 15 successful legis la-
111.. t^lli[icaJ activities. The
;alional currenlly faces sever-
cats 10 its members' heallh,
I and rights.
motion from the noor to
d the resolution and cut the
ase for FIREPAC in half - to
cents per capita - drew
g negative reaclion and was
, dry defeated by the delegates.
n Terry. president of the
fomia Professional
,fighters. said, "the
:national came in and stepped
10 the plale with FIREPAC
. le)' [0 help us de(u[ Prop. 226.
v we need to step up to the
e for FJREPAC:'
~spite the defeat of Proposition
I in California. paycheck pro-
:ion is still alive in 29 other
les. Right.to-work referenda
,m in several others. And the
ion's top legislative priority,
:ir 'lIeclive bargaining, still
;L, ' c significant hurdles
fore"jinal passage.
rhe (nlemationa] is also building
, her tools for political success.
.:luding the recently completed
lining school for IAFF members
ho are elected officials, candi-
Jtes or political aClivists, the first
r which was held in Baltimore.
Hop ~ ~ faritJ1,
,,/r1twI1o IN r<<JvtdoG floor.
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. --'-. --...-.
NIOSH Finds Hearing Loss
Still Plagues Fire Fighters
Fire' fighters are sliU sutTering
disproportionate levels of hearing
loss, according (0 preliminary
analysis ofhearin& tests conducted
at the lAFF's recenl convention in
AoridlL
, The IAFF Department. of
Occupational Health and Safety. in
conjunction with lhe Nalional
Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH). gave dele-
gates a chance to have their hear-
ing te51ed while they were in
Florida in August.
The NlOSH hearing test consis[-
cd of a questionnaire and a pure-
lone test 10 measure hearing over a
range of frequencies.
Testing personnel explained the
results 10 each p:u1icipanl al Ihe
completion of the test. and they
will soon mail a wrinen explana-
tion to each participant's home.
NIOSH will also pcrfonn a more
detailed analysis to compare this
year's results to a similar lest
adininistered at the IAFF's 1984
Convenlion held in Cincinnati.
Of the 458 fire fighters tesled in
Aorida, two-thirds had measurable
hearing loss.
Test results indicate that despite
the availllbility of quielCr appara-
tus and increased awareness, fU'e
fighler exposure to noise is stiU a
significant hazard.
Good hearing is a matter of life
and death for fire figbters.
Unfortunately, fire fighters are
consuml1y exposed to loud noises
- from sirens, air hams, appara-
tus engines, and powered hand
tools such as those used in forcible
cntry. ventilation, and extrication
Dcli vilies.
Making 8 bad situation worse,
many of the chemicals encoun-
tered fighting a rlJ'C produce a
greater hearing loss than expecled
when lice fighters are exposed to
both thc noise and [oxic agents.
And a number of studies demon-
strate that noise may have an
ndvc:rse impact on both the phy,lo-
logical and psychological aspects
of a person's general health.
Studies have shown noise to be a
risk factor in stress-related illness-
es like hypenension, ulcus. aller-
gies, IInd neurological disorders.
Noise has been shown to cause
nervousness, reM, psychosomatic
illness, and sleep disturbances.
.some warning signs of hearing
loss include:
· You must shout in order (0 be
heard by someone near you
.Your hearing is dulled immedi-
ately after your work shift
.You experience noises in your
head or ringing in your ears
.You have difficulty hearing peo-
ple when others are talking
.You regularly experience
headaches during or after your
work shift
Each fire department should have
a he:uing conservation program
which includes a process to identi-
fy area.. and equipment that arc
potentially hazardous to the hear-
ing of fire fighters and EMTs..Programs should identify ways
that either reduce the noise pro-
duced by equipment or prolect the
fire fighlerlEMT (rom the noise.
fire fighters should receive annual
bearing tests to lrack their hearing
fonn year to year.
Locals should contact the
Depanment of Occupational
Health nnd Safety for more infor-
mation about hearing conservation
programs.
INRRHAnONAl fiRE fiGHTER
...--...-........
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, City of Clearwater
MISSION STATEMENT
,~
The City of Clearwater government provides the municipal services
and infrastructure necessary for a high quality of life for all citizens.
City of Clearwater
VALUES
CARING. We will act in w::)'s that promote a thriving community and
ci~zenry. We will demonstrate concern and respect for our citizens and our
employees by being attentive to all sides of an issue. We will r.ncourage
teamwork, trust, respect, and open commWlication.
. . . . .
WELL-RUN. We co~t to efficient, effective, economical provision of
services. We will plan and organize to accomplish these goals through
.' .'"') innovation, excellent service, and removing barriers. We will seek and retain
, ,_/ the bes~ leaders. Our employees will be knowledgeable and customer
service oriented.
INTEGRITY. We will be honest, straightforward, and courageous in our
actions. ,We will be fair, ethical, and consistent as we strive to attain our
. .
VISion.
QUTST ANDING 'QUALITY We. will set and maintain high
,standards. We will provide extraordinary service and require excellence at
every level.
FUTURE ORIENTED DECISION-MAKING. We undeIstand
that the decisions we make today establish the infrastructure, quality of life.
and.the direction of our community for future generations. We will nlake
informed decisions by considering the pros and cons, the ramifications, the
costs, and the alternatives.
'10
23
''"\ CLEARWATER ,FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
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, ,
I. c,
, '
INTERNATIONAL ASS OCIATION
OF FIRE FIGHTERS
LOCAL 1158
-
CRAIG CRAMER PATRICK SHEPLER FRED MAIER
SeaetarylTreasurer President ExecuUve Vice President
.. Our Mission is to work
\
, .'
. . cooperatively with labor
and management to provide
cost effective, top quality
emergency services while
ensuring and improving the
safety and benefits for our
, members.
:()
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~'h~ .j~~~~ .".....io~U-~... .'
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OVERVIEW
EIBRGROUND STA,F.frN((
STANDARDS ,STUDIES AND 81 A 11STlCS
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National Fire Protection Association #197, Training Standard on Initial Fire Attack
. Outlined specific functions and time inlelVals for effective fireground operations.
National Fire Protection Association Book, Fjr~ Attack-l
. Stated that the initial response to a single storJ residential structural fire be comprised
of at least 15 firefighters and a Chief Officer.
Eire {>rotection Handbook
. Supported NFPA #197 I
. Stated that tWs minimal level of staffing is effective for standard single family
residences with no major rescue or exposure problems.
. Recommended increased response levels for larger hazards.
"
1
International City Management Association, Managing Fire Seryjce.s
. 'Supported NFP A Standards
. Elaborated on the basic, simultaneous functions required for effective fire suppression
operations
. Stated that property loss, injuries and fire spread will significanUy increase when fire
departments are unable to assemble 16 firefighters on the scene of a working
structural fire within the critical time frame
. Deemed 5 person crews 100% effective, 4 person crews 65% effective and 3 person
companies 38% effective when conducting frrefighting operations
,,'_r'''"'
Nalional Fire Protection Assoc. #1410, Training Standard on Initial Attack
. Found 5 member crews to be the more coordinated fire approach
. Recommended minimal acceptable fireground staffing levels of 4 personnel on all
engine and ladder companies when responding to any type fire
. Noted a significant reduction in perfonnance and safety when staffing falls below the
minimal level
Centaur/FEMA Study
. Found personnel safety to be the paramount factor when determining effective crew
size and initial response
OWo State University Study
. Reviewed actual fuegroWld operations oCthe Columbus, Ohio Fire Department
. Found sighificant increases in firefighter injuries and fire spread when less than IS
persomiel were initially operating
. Noted that staffing had an even more dramatic impact on firefighter injuries at large
risk fires (high rises, conunercial buildings, hospitals, nursing bomes, etc.)
o
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. '. .... '. ~ -. I'" . ." . "I '. ,."..: .'. . I" '" ". '. .' ~ . . . I . ~ '
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Seattle. Washington Fire Department Study
. Documcni'ca a 54% increase in personnel hours lost due to injury when operating
with 3 person crews in comparison with 4 person companies
Dallas. Texas Fire Department Study
. Found 5 person crews a more coordinated and effective approach to Cire and rescue
operations
. Described a 4 person crew as capable of performing these same functions in a
satisfactory manner.
. Regarded the J person crew level as leaving little margin for error. with any
appreciable delay possibly placing control of the lire beyond their control
. Indicated that inadequate staffing resulted in:
1) An even greater loss of overaU fir~ground operation effectiveness
2) -Increased physiological stress on personnel as they try to compensate for the
lower staffing levels
3) Increased risk to firefighters during aggressive attacks due to improper
support
National Fire Academy Research Project
. Implied that a smaller work force must still' complete all the functions that were
previously accomplished by larger crews. increasing firefighter injuries
. ' Conducted evolutions with 3>> 4 and 5 person crews and recorded the foHowing
outcomes:
1) 5 person crews completed tasks significantly faster and showed little evidence
of fatigue
2) 4 person crews required more time and were near exhaustion upon completion
. 3) 3 person crews were nearly 3 rimes slower and were exhausted, rubber legged,
had difficulty standing up and were unfit for further assignments
U.S. Fire Academy, Fire Risk AnaJysis~ A System's App(Qat;h
. Stated that suppression effectiveness must be measured by a department's ability to
provide simultaneous fire attack, rescue and support functions
. Found that time to assemble sufficient personnel is the critical factor in detennining
effectiveness
. R~uired at least 15 personnello conduct an effective interior attack
Phoenix>> Arizona Fire Department Evaluation System (FIREDAP)
. Recognized 15 personnel as the minimum number of personnel necessary to
extinguish a working fire in a single story residence of20oo square feet with no
exterior exposures .
Austin, Texas Fire Department Study
. Compared crew efficiency of3 person versus 4 person crews based on timed
evolutions with an average 4 person efficiency improvement of 58%
. Measured physiological effects of3 person versus 4 person crews
1) 4 person crews recorded a notable decrease in cardiovascular stress levels and
-.....- ..
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air consumption per firefighter
2) Obvious visual crrecls of exhaustion were significantly more dramatic in the
3 person crew
· Reviewed injury repons and found a 46% higher rate of injury for personnel of 3
person crews as compared to crews of larger size
It Cited that inadequate staffing caused the fonowing problems:
1) Higher risk for victims
2) Loss of critical functions
3) Increased loss of overall effectiveness
,4) Higher physiological stress on firefighters
'5) Higher risk to firefighter safety
. Concluded that increasing staffing levels from 3 to 4 personnel would provide the
following benefits:
1) Lower fire damage donar loss and higher loss/save ratio
2) Fewer injuries for civilians and firefighters
3) Fewer Worker's Compensation claims for firefighters
4) Retainment of tax base properties
5) Lower civil liability for Fire Departments and municipalities
Metropolitan Fire Chiefs Division of the International Association of Fire Chiefs
. Addressed effective minimum staffing levels of 5 persormel on each engine and
ladder truck company
. Supported this position with the following factors
1) Fire companies should be able to function as an independent unit
21 Combining two companies to assemble the appropriate number of personnel
, to perfonn fircground tasks dramatically and adversely affected the standard'
operating procedures
3) Understaffing prevents appropriate coverage of internal and exterior
exposures '
4) There is sufficient documentation indicating increased injury rates to civilians
and firefighters as well as higher property losses due (0 inadequate staffing
5) The tasks that must be completed at every fire scene cannot be altered
6) The current status oCstaffing and fire company reductions is at a dangerously
low level
7) This firm position is based solely in the interest orUte safety of the citizens
and the 'fuefighling personnel that serve them
NFP A Annual National Fire Experience Swvey
· Found a 6.4% increase in the rate of firefighter fireground injuries
· Noted a decline in injuries associated with breathing apparatus protection
· Docwnented a 15.1 % increase in injuries associated with understaffed fireground
operations
John Hopkins University Study
.' Compared the injury rate for cities operating 4 person crews venms those entities
operating 3 person companies
o
.::.J1w.. ..~,:.: r.... .... +h.< .
'. .
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· Found a 36.3% increase in the firefighter injury rate of J person crews
· Established that the statistical significance of this data is not due (0 random chance
Providence, Rhode Island Study
· Compared Iirelighter fireground injury rates of 3 person versus 4 person crews by
increasing their minimum staffing levels
· Reported a 23.8% decrease in the number of injuries with increased staffing
· Documented a 7 J % decrease in work time Jost
· Noted a dramatic decrease in the frequency and severity of fireground injuries
Nevada Department of Industrial Relations Division of Occupational Safety and Heallh
. RecogruzCd an "industI)' standard for minimal fireground staffLng"
. Filed a complaint based on this standard against (he Clark COWlty Fire Department
NFPA #1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health
. Recommended minimum acceptable fire company staffing should be 4 members
, ' arriving on each engine and ladder company responding to any type fire
· Recognized 5 and 6 member crews as minimal staffing for high risk areas
. Recommends the following additional staffing needs:
1) Every fire scene will have an Incident Conunander (Chief Officer)
2) PersonneI will be dedicated to the Safcty Officer role
3) A firefighter accountability systcm will be implemented and staffed
appropriately
,J Fcderal Occupational Safety and Health Act's"2 IN/2 OUT" Standard
· Mandates a 2 person dedicated firefighter rescue (eam staged outside the hazard area
during interior structural firefighting :
· Considered the minimum acceptable standard for safe fireground staffing
· Has been adopted by the Pinellas County Fire Chiefs Association and is addressed as
a County standard operating procedure '
· Expected to be adopted by the Florida Department of Labor
International City Management Association, Msmaging :E:ire Services
· Excerpt oftext:
On the other hand, toofew companies, or poorly manned ones, can result in property
and life loss beyond community excepted norms. Also, the cost of afirefighter death
or a disabling injury may far exceed the expense of a fire company. This is not to say
that there is afued value on a life or injury. The point is that thefirefightingjOrces
are the asset that protects the community's economic and tax base as well as its
health and welfare. 11zis asset is a valuable one and must be carefully provided and
wisely managed.
" ,
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SAFE FIRE GROUND STAITINO
OOTUNE
,OJ
'.I of serious i~Uries and death of fire fighters
rating at SltUCNral fires is escalating. Srudies
chat there is a correlation between fire fighter
injuries and fltc ground sLaffing at initial aJanns for
SU\lctural flfCS. As a fl!'C fighter. this issue is vila! to
your safeey and your furure. Safe Fire Ground
Staffing will assist you in addressing this problem as
well as help you develop strategies to advance the
issue of safe mirumum staffing before your member-
ship. political bodies and other parties.
OBJECTIVE.
The ,objectives of this workshop arc to:
"' familiarize you with mosc benchmarks by whicb
safe and effective minimum flte suppression services
,should be addressed:
.n') "' acquaint you with data showing the impact of ini-
__j tiaJ flfC allaC" on property loss and citizen safety;
.. familiarize you with different srudies whose data
supports safe flIe ground staffing levels;
"' assist you in delermining a local jurisdiction's
overall flte protettion requirements.
COMPETENCIES
At the conclusion of this workshop, you will bave
received training and information to assist you in
accomplishing cacb of the following competencies. ,
You will:
.. understand the relationship between e~pected level
of service and adequate staffing levels;
.. know the differences between offensive and defen-
sive attacks and how they relate to safe fare ground
staffing;
.. be able to Identify me tv.'o major clements of fire
protection services and how their balance has been
upset in fe(ent yean;
.. understand the impact of technology on safe fire
\....J grou nd staffin g;
~ have the ability to discuss the requirements of
NFPA 197, NFPA 1410. NFPA 1500, and the NFPA
Fir~ Prot~ction Handbook as they relate. to safe fire
ground staffing;
~ be able to identify the results of several staffing
studies. including the following: CentaurlFEMA
Study, Columbus Study. Seattle F'tre Deparunent
Srudy, DalIas Fire Dcpanment Study, and FIREDAP:
~ understand the ramifications of the complaint filed
, against the Clark Couney Ftre Depanment in 1989;
"' be able to show how the average annual rate of
fire ground injuries has increased since the publica-
tion of NFPA 1500: '
.. be able to recognize the conclusions of the lAFFs
Death and Injury Survey as they pertain to safe fltC
ground staffing;
~ have a general underswlCling of recent study by
the lAFF in cooperation with lohn Hopkins
University on flte fighter injuries and inadequate
Stafflllg levels;
~ be able to identify me affects of increasing staffing
from three to four persons based on a recent trial
experience in Providence. Rhode Island;
~ be able to list what (actot'S'tIle level 0: service pro-
vided by a flIe depanment is based upon;
~ have the abiliey to list the four elements of
response time and identify the average response time
of staffed departments;
.. know that response times for fire suppression are
consistent with those recommended by the American
J:fean Association (AHA) for lhe deU\'ery of emer- .
gency medical services;
~ be able to identify the tactical fire suppression
goals defmed by the International City Management
Association (leMA).
:a
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The successful attainment of ll1e goals of both
prevention and suppression require a balanced
:lpproach and commitment of emphasis and
resources. ThJs baJance bms In reccn~ years been
tipped in the direction of fire prevention whil~
largely ignorint-fllc suppression.
During the six. year period 1978.84, metuures of
both fire prevention and fire suppression cll.hlbited
equaJly Impressive resulu. Through the effortS of
fire prevention. the lOlaJ nllmber of residential
fires declined t 4.7%, while the toW number of
civilian deluhs and Injuries, respectively. dropped
by 31.4% and 9.~%.
, As the data in the following lII.ble sbows, the con-
cern with fire prevention has been subsuntiaJly
rewarded. According to the NFPA's Annual
National Fire Experience Survcy, the total number
of fircs. civilian deaths, and Injuries has dccUncd
remarkably over thc last decade. This data attests
to the substantial Impact that public education,
smoke detectors, and development and enlorce-
ment of building codes can have on prcventing
fires.
Tn those situations where fires did occur. fire
fighting also scored substantial gains. During the
period. the rale of civilian deaths per 1,000 fues
declined 19.6%, while the rate of civilian Injuries
and real property damage showed only modest
increases.
However in the taner half of rhe decade, the
results were substantially differenL Between
1984 and 1991, the rate of civilian fire deaths per
t,ooo residential rues increased 9.8%, the ralC of '
c~vilian injuries increased 47.9% and rea! property
loss rose ro.5%.
However. ctoser examinalion of the same data
also. tells the other side of the story, which is Lhat
de-emphasis' of flee suppression in recent years
has led 10 increasing rates of civiUan deaths and
injuries and property loss when fires do occur.
r
. RATE PER 1,000
RESIDENTIAL FIRES
Total TotAl ToUI Ofrtct Propcr17 Rea! Property
'j Resldu~da1 ctvlllaD CI Yilla.a C1l'illaa CIl'illaa o.macePer l>tmIlt Per
Year f11ti Deatha bl,Il1rles Dealba I D,j uries ResideDtIaI FIre RtStdeDtW F11'! (1 J
1978 730.500 6.185 21,260 8.47 29.1 53,000.68 $4,602
1979 72 1.500 5,765 20.450 7.99 28.3 53,505.20 $4.828
1980 757,500 5,446 21,100 7.19 27.9 $4,015.84 $4,874
1981 733,000 5,540 20,375 7.56 27.8 $4,446.11 $4.891
1982 676,500 4,940 21,100 7.30 31.2 $4,808.57 $4,983
1983 641.500 4,820 . 21,450 7.51 __ 33.4 55,153.55 $5,174
1984 623,000 4.240 19.275 6.81 30.9 $5.521.67 55,314
1985 622,000 5,025 19,825 8.08 31.9 $6,067.52 $5,623
1986 581,500 4,770 19.025 ~.20 32.7 $6,115.22 $5,580
1987 551,500 4.660 20.440 8.45 37.1 $6,707.16 S5.904
1988 552,500 5,065 22,600 9.17 4Q.9 57,276.02 56,150
1989 513.500 4,435 20.750 8.64 40.4 57,785.78 56,279
1990 467,000 4,115 20,650 8.81 44.2 59,107.07 56,968
1991 478,000 3.575 21,850 7.48 45.7 511,615.06 $8,528
1978-84 .14.7% -31.4% -9.3% -19.6% 6.2% 84.0% 15.5%
1984-91 -23.3% -15.7% 13.4% 9.8% 47.9% 110.4% 60.5%
<..J
[II Detennined by deflating the direct property damage by the CPI-U.
7
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".: . " ",. ,,' .:' ': '.' . .- .':::.> :':'. " ',:': . :.:.'~ ~.:;': . " ,'..'. .' "':, : '.,: ""::" ::::. ~,; ",:: '. :';.,' " :.... ~'. .:""
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Given the total requirements of fire fighting per-
sonnel and equipment to safely conduct an ini-
tiaJ interior structural fire anack and provide
prc-hospiul-emergency medical care according
to the industry's standard. the only politically
dri...en decision that is appropriately within a
local community's discretion is response limes.
For it is through its decision regarding these
response times that the local community defines
the acceptable level of risk in providing the
delivery of lire suppression services.
c. TACTICAL FIRI: SUPPREIUOH
G OA".
Instructor Notes:
" Discuss ~ach of the tactical fire suppression
goals defined by the leMA.
" Point out that NIOSH has staled that a two
man engine company is 50% understaffed and
that they have found no support for minimum
staffing fewu than four (use slides #43 and
#44).
... Discuss t~ Nevada OSHA Standard regard.
ing stoffing (use slide #45),
" Discuss OSHA Standards penaining to
staffing (use slides 1146 - #51).
The International City Management Association
(lCMA) dermes just such a set of tactical rue
suppression goals as the following:
"1. For all stTUcturalfirts, lQ,~}lO~
tngine company with!!! ffl:!1Ji mf,rwlu and an...
addiiiOMiingiiii:&omDf111y', o~~.com-,
parry. OM ~ ~ai;d'One &hU/ offi--,
cer.wiJJWr-tat.{lOJ.JfdnaIa'/dL 90 JHrcmJ of
all ~itr.QlIttI.r.JVillr jf 1T<{IliJYd ~ flow 01-.
4,5(J(),goJ1IJIu ~r.11'JirJuU (GPM) or ltss, For
all areas over 4,500 GPM, the first engine and
tTUck (ladder) must arrive within five (S) min-
utes for 90 pu-cent of all alomu. The Iopud
rime (refla rirnt) is to include fire dispatch
and response ri~. The objective is to control
the fi re before flashovu (sudden sprrad), or
beforr thefi~ has extended beyond the first
(original) area of involvement. (Using rhe
standard tim~ vUSUJ rempuature CU11'e as a
base, flashover (s eJtimaud to be ~i81ct (8"'~:.
minutu after, ignition in standard ~ls.J.. _' ,_.
....-.. ...-.
2. The general taen'cal
objecti~'e is (0 develop
an auackfor'Ct that
can agCrtssively
advance two standard
fire stream hand lints
(or the equivalent).
For major emergen-
cies be)'ond the nor-
mal capability of the
first alann assign.
ment, the objective is
to deploy a pro-
gr~d reurve and
automatic aidfire
force of six (6) engine
companies, three (3)
trud: (ladder) compa-
nies, and thru (3)
chief officers within
fifteen (/5) minutes of
a thirr/ a/ann. The
objun've ;s to prevent
Jorge fires from
extending to ot~r
structures.
---
J, For all firt and
emugendts (i.e., a'
probability offire or
explosion) in petro/e-
lU11 storage and pro-
duction areas. to
deploy, within ten (/0)
minutes. special light
waler or foamfirt
fighting equipment
, and prepare for long
relays and tJ.unded
pumping operations.
The objurive is to
provide ttv:ine compa-
nies with adequate
petroleum /ire fighting
equipmtnL For fires
in warer iUficienl
areas. the objective is
to dtplDy, within ten
(10) minutes. a
.--...
I
.. (ncreasta pll)'siological strtss on fire fighr-
us as they Iry to compensat~ for the lower
staffing level,' and
" Increaud risk to the firt fighters when
aggressive proudufts are undertaken without
the support "mctssary 10 compltle thtm safely, "II
The National Fire Academy also noted in a
research project developed for its Executive
Development ill Program that:
"In 1977 a test was conducud by the Dallas
Fire Department, which consisttd of a simu-
latedftre invol",ing sevual roonu atlhe rear
olthe lhirdfloorofan oW school, This simu-
lattd./irt was being done 10 delef7Tline how
long it look a Ihru, four. or five man learn to
advance ils line to tltis area. get warer on the
fire. and 10 check each individuals phy.fical
condition afttr...,..ards. TIming began as each
engine company enitred lhe school yard.
The aVtrage ti~ aflhe Engine Companies is
revealing. 1k firsl consiSled of a thru-man
team and lhtiraverage was 18.18 minuus.
All personnel wue txhausted. rubb~ legged.
JuuJ difficulty standing up and all three were
unftr for further fire fighting.
The four-man team conducting Ihe very same
test, avtraged 10.29 minutes and upon com-
pleting they wtrr nearing t.thauslion.
Next came thefive-man team which averaged
6.15 minutes. and nfierwarrls all showed linle
evidence of fatig~. " "
The Academy's project report weot 00 further to
state:
"The implican'on is lhat when a smalltr work
force, using lhe stunt heavy equiptmnJ, has to
do Ihe job IIuu was done in Ihe pasl by a larg-
t( worlifor'Ct, injuries of this Iwrure will con-
tinue 10 increase. Injuries to back and hues
are injuries lhallak a long time 10 cor~ct.
'nIe (OJll0 the dty
and dtpartment art
heavy. ..:0
H. FIRE
b EPAIU'MEN'I'
EVALU....TION
SYSTEM
(FI RE DIlP)
[nstrucror Notes:
. Discuss (he cone/u-
sian of F1REDAP (use
slides #32 and #33).
In December 1991, the
Phoe nilt, AZ Fire
Department developed
the Fire Department
Evaluation System
(FIREDAP) to precisely
identify the components
and objectives for com-
plying with NFPA's
1410 Training Standard
on Wtial Fue Attack.11
"This evaluation system
involved responding to
and extinguishing a
working flfe in a single
story residential strUc-
NtC of 2.000 square feet
with no exterior expo-
sures.
The Department COD-
c1uded that to safely
..... conduct an aggressive
interior anack b~ OD
st.andard evolutions and
the critical tasks that
needed to be accom-
plished required 15
perwnnel distributed as
foUows neltt page:
1 11 IbId.. p. 1,2.
'''~<<~ II 'Fire Eng1nes Am BocominQ Expensive Taxi CabS-Inadequate MaIlnlng,' Nalional Fire Academy,
Executive Development III Program, 1981, p. 4.
l'D IbId,. p.2. .
II 'Fire Departmont Evaluation System (FIREDAP),' Phoenix, IV- Fire Depar1moot.. December 1991, p. 1.
n
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RATE OF FIRE FIGHTER FIRE GROUND INJURIES PER 1,000 FIRES
WowuIJ. DbJoadoDl,
Smoke Fnmuu, Heart
AYene' Onr rohal.don. Eye Attack. Stnbu and
Period T olAl . InJuries, BUrDI Spra1a:l
1981-1986 25.22 8.89 13.54 .
1987..1991 26.66 7.77 15.48
Percentage Change 5.7% (12.6%) 14.3%
NOTE: Prior to 1981. data was not classified in same manner
Source: NFPA Annual National Fm: Experience Survey
\:J
Comparing the average annual rate of fire
ground injuries for the six-year period prior to
the promulgation of NFPA 1500 to thc five-year
post NFPA 1500 period, rcvcaJslhat those ,
injuries (i.c.. smoke inhalation. cye injuries and
bums) most closely associated with SCBA
usage and personal protective equipment
declincd by 12.6%. On the othcr hand. the rate
of fue ground injuries lor those injuries (i.e.,
wounds, dislocations, fractures. heart attacks.
strains and sprains) associated with understaffed
fm: ground operations increased by 14.3%.
In 1990. the lAFF's Death and InjllI)' Survey
recordcd a severity rate of 5.605 toss work
hours from job-related injuries and illness per
100 fm: fighters. While just twelve months
later, thc data for 1991 revealed that the rate of
loss work time resulting from fire fighter
injuries had increased 10% to 6,166 hours per
100 fm: fighters.
A recent study produced by the: lAFF with the
cooperation of Iohns Hopkins University also
reflects the fact that flre fighter injuries are sig-
nificantly influenced by inadequar.c staffmg.
This analysis compared the rate of injuries pcr
100 flre fighters and per 100 alarm, for cities
operating 4 person staffmg versus those operat-
ing 3 persoll units.
\...J '
The,analysis showed that:
4 Citics that operated fIre suppression com-
panies with less than 4 personnel had an, injllI)'
rate per 100 workers that was 36.3% greater
than those cities who had StaffUlg levels of 4
or more;
4 The percentage of cities having an injury
rate of 10 injuries or morc per 100 flfC fighters
was nearly double for those operating with
less than 4 person crews as compared to those
cities operating with minimum staffmg Icvcls
of 4 or more;
4 Fire fightcr injury rates per 100 alarms
were an average of 38% greater in citics with
minimum staffing of less than 4 personnel per
unit: and
4 72.5% of the cities staffing with Icss than 4
had an injury rate per 100 alarms of 0.5 or
greater compared to only 35.3% of the cities
..... staffing with at least 4 per fire suppression
uniL .
Tests for !:tatistical significance on this data
established that such difference.'i in the injury
rates associated with 3 versus 4 person staffmg
are not due to random chance.
L. PROVIDENCE, ftl EXPIUUENCE
Instructor Nous:
4 Discuss t~ rtsults of the trial exptrience in
Provit:kllCt, Rhtxk Island (use sUlks #41 and #42).
a:s
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But, as an article in Fire Engineering succinctly
put it:
"AfoolbaU coach who senl his learn 0111 on
the field with six men and then fed the Olher
five in piectmeal as Ihe game prog~sud
would be considered an idiol. Yet this is the
same policy lhat many ciry officials and Ihtir
hired consullanlS are forcing on firt chie/s-
always in Ihe guise of greater efficiency and,
of couru, economy.
One man CMnot bt called a firt company, no
marter how many men a~ available after he
has made a sizeup cwJ hol/e~d for ht/p.
Neithu can /Wo or thru men be considued a
fire company. (These a~ not enough 10 han-
dle a lair-sized grass firt.J'of
The requirement for initial arriving apparatus to
be staffed with at least 4 personnel to initiate an
interior rue attack is not new. Il has been the
rue service standard and industry practice for
most of the twentieth century. as well as. recog-
nized and recommended by the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) since atlcast
1962. The adherence to a minimum level of
safety staffIng grew out of intuition and experi-
ence and is empirically grounded in resullS from
study after study showing the causal relationship
of deficient fl!C ~und staffIng and increased
fire fighter injuries.
B. NATIONAL FIRe PROTECTIOK
Ass 0 CJA'J'ION (NFPA)
lnstrucror Nom:
~ Discws NFPA /97 (use slitk Ill).
4 Discws NFPA /410 (we slides #12. #/4).
~ Discws NFPA 1500 (USt slides #15. #19).
4 Poinl oUl lhaI 1M NFPA produced ils most
strongly worrkd staJerunll onfirt ground
slaffing to dare in its /991 version O/IM NFPA
Firt Prolection Handbook (we slides #20 ~ #23).
In 1966, the National FU'C Protection
Association issued NFPA Standard 197,
Tratning Standard on Initial Fin Attack. ThIs
standard set forth the evolutions required for an
initiaJ jn~rior attaclc 00
working structural rl1'eS.
The minimum standard
required sufficient num.
her of fU'C fighters and
equipment to deploy
two attack one.and-one.
ha1f inch hose lines pro-
ducing at least 150 gpm
within 60 seconds of
arrival, followed by a
two-and-onc-balf inch
backup line providing a1
least 250 gpm within
180 seconds of arrival.
While the NFPA 197 did
not specify the Dumber
of rue fighters necessary
to deliver this required
now, it does specify the
tasks thal mUSl be per-
formed within a given
time pc riod.
Although NFPA 197
was silent on the mini-
mum Dumber of fJJ"e
fi ghters necessary to
safely conduct these
evolutions, the National
rl!C Prot.ec:tion
Association clearly
defined in their book.
FIre Attack.I, the num-
ber of personnel
.... required:
.. SuuuJard Wtial fire
arrack/or isolated
building: of average
sizt such as one. 0,.
two-story single family
dwellingl consuL! of
ability to quickly apply
/ /Il-mch attack Iw,
plus at kast one stan.
dnrd 250 gpm stream
from 2 II2-inch hose
· *Man Power. How Much 00 You N&ed?,. James F. Casey, Fire Engiooen'ng, Octobell969, p. 1 f 2.
rl
TYPICAL INITIAL AT'rACK RESPONSE CAPABILITY ASSUMING
INTERIOR ATTACK AND OPERATIONS RESPONSE CAPABILITY
.
,
High-Huard Occupancies (Schools, hospitals, nursing homes, explosive plants, refineries, high-rise
buildings, and oUier high life hazard or large ftre potentiaJ occupancies)
At least 4 pumpers, 2 ladder trucks (or combination apparatus with equivalent capabilities), 2 chief officers,
and other specialized apparatus as may be needed to cope with the combustible involved, not less lhan 24 rue
fighters and 2 chief officers.
Medium-Hazard Occupancies (Apartmellts. offices, mercantile and industrial occupancies not normally
requiring elttensive rescue or rue fighting forces)
At least 3 pumpers. 1 ladder truck (or combination apparatus with equivalent capabilitics), 1 chief officer, and
othcr speciaJized apparatus as may be needed or available: not less than 16 rue fighters and 1 chief officer.
Low-Hazard Occupancies (One, two- or three-family dwc:lUngs and scattered small businesses and
industrial occupancies)
At least 2 'pumper'S, 1 ladder truck (or combination appararus with equivalent capabilities), 1 chief officer, and
other specialized apparatus as may be needed or avaitable, not less than 12 ftre ftghters and 1 chief officer.
Rural OperatIons (Scauercd dweUings, small businesses, and farm buildings)
\
....-.-...
At least 1 pumper with a large water tanl (500 gal [1. 9m3] or more), one mobile water supply apparatus (1000
gal [3.78103] or larger), and suc.b other specialized apparatus as may be necessary to perform effective initial
fire fighting operations: at least 12 fire fighters and 1 chief officer.
AddltloDal Alarms
At least lhe equivalent of lhat required for Runt Operations for second aJanns; equipment as may be needed
according to the type of emerg..:ncy and capabilities of the fire departmeDL This may involve the immediate
use of murual aid companies untillocaJ forces can be supplemented with additional off-duty personnel. In
some communities, single units are "special called" when needed. without always reporting to a multiple
alarm. Additional units aloo :nay be needed to fill at least so~e empty fm: stations.
....
numbu of firefighurs rtfiuired 10 s~arch and
rescue should MVer be fewer than two and
l)'Pically alleastfour. 1M ruunber of firefight-
us nttd~d to advaru:e and operale O~ hose
lint varies from two on sl1UJller lines 10 four
on lorse hand lines.
gallons ofwalu per minute/or every 100
cubic fetl of involved fire area wilh typical fire
loading. An aTta 0/40 ftetlry 4fJ ltel with 8-
fOOl ctilings requirts J84 gallora per m"nlll~.
7Wo hose lines are nutkd 10 produce thai
flOw. and a lhird Iln.t 10 cover tMfloor above.
Exposure coverage and search and ftscue art
nol yer taUn inlO consUkrruion. but alftady
eighl or nine hosefMn 'art neethd, plus tM
pump operators, plus the supervisor.
v
The slandard/onnulafor determining 1M vol-
ume a/water lIuded and the number of hose
lines to be advanced al a working structural
firt is based on Q minimU17l of two ~n8ine com.
ponies with at least tightfirrfighten. This
fonnula ca1/s for Ihe discharge of Ihrte
Various controlled and statistically based
experi~nts by so~ dties and universities
II
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SAn: FIRE GROUND STIUTlNG
BmLlooRAPBY
American Insurance AssociaLlon, "rite Department
Efficiency," Speciallntcresl BuUetin No. 131.
December 1975.
American Insurance Association. "Fire Department
Manning," Special Interesr BuUetin No. 319,
December 1975.
Brunacini, Alan V., "Shrinking Resources vs. Staffing
Realities," NFPA Journal, May/June 1992, pp.28 &
120.
Brunacini. Alan V., "What Happens When Manpower
is Reduced?." lntematioTUlI Fire Chief, January 1983,
Vol. 491, pp. 17-18.
Casey, James F., "Manpower - How Much Do You
Need?," Fire Engineering, October 1969, pp. lU-
113.
p
Centaur Associates (conducted for FEMA), "Report
on the Survey of rlIC Suppression Crew Size
Practices:' June 30, 1982, pp. 18-20.
Cushman, Jon, Seattle, WA rU'C Department's
"Abstract: RepOrt to Executi"e Board. Minimum
Manning as Health & Safety Issue., II 1981.
Edwasds, C. Bruce, ''Critical Flow Ratc.." Fire
Engineering, Seplember 1992, pp. 97-99.
Gerard.lobn C. and 1acobsen. A. Teny, "Reduced
Sta!fmg: At What Cost?" Fi~ Service Today.
September ,1981, pp. 15-21.
Insurance Services Office, "rue Suppression Rating,
Schedwe," 1980.
Internationnl Association of rU'C Chiefs, "lAFC
Accreditation Committee Surveys rU'C Department.
Charts Respon..~ Tames," On Scene. September It
1992, pp. 7.8.
International AssociaLlon of Fire Fighters, "Analysis
o( Fire Fighter Injuries and Minimum StaffIng Per
Piece of Apparatus in Cities With Populations of
150,000 or More," December 1991.
International City Management Association.
Managing Fin Services, (Washington, DC: leMA)
1979, pp. 80, 214-215, & 218.219.
International City Management Association.
Managing Fire Servius, 2nd Edition (Wash1ngton.
IX:: lCMA) 1988, pp. 119-120.
International CitY Managers' Association, Municipal
Fire A(Dm'nistration (Chicago, IT.: leMA) 1967, pp. .
161.162.
Journal 01 the American Medical A.ssociation,
"Enswing Effectiveness o( Community-wide
Emersency Cardiac Care," October 28, 1992; p.
2184.
Kimball, Warren 'Y., Fire A.ttad:.J Command
DecLrions and Company O/Urarions (Boston. MA:
NFPA) 1966, pp. 2Q.21 & 44.
Kimball, WarreD 'Y.. Manning lor Fire Attack (Boston.
MA: NFPA) 1969.
McManis Associates and lohn T. O'Hagan and
Associates. "Dallas flre Department Staffing Level
Shut)'." June 1984, pp.I-2 & 11.1 tbru n-7.
Meade, William P.. "A Fust Pass at Computing the
Cost of rue Safety in a Modem Society," Marcb
1991.
MetrO ChieCslIntcmational Association of rU'e Chiefs.
"MetrO FIre Chiefs - Minimum Stamng Position."
May 1992.
Monison, Richard C., "Manning Levels for Engine
and Ladder Companies in Small F'lT'C DepartmeolS."
1990.
:11
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Indianapolis Athletic C?lub Fire
Indianapolis, Indiana
(February 5, 1992)
, ,
hivestig~ted by: Mark Chubb
, '
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, I
, ThIs (s R'eport 063 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted
by TrlCats Corporation under contract EMW-90-C.333.8 to the ,United
States FIre Administration, 'Federal Emergency Management Agency. '
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Federal Emergency Management ~ Agency
United States Fire Administration
National Fire Data Center
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Lessons Learned or Reinforced SectIon from
the Athledc Club Fire Review Panel Report
This list of lessons leamed is reproduced from the report of the Review Panel
convened to investigate the Indianapolis Athletic Club Fire.
· The inevitable fact is that disastrous incidents will occur.
· There is no substitute for proper training.
. Training is not an area to enact budget cuts..
· Standard operating procedures are necessary, and must be followed.
. Beware of "routine'l situations, there is no such thing.
. Firefighters must be familiar with all building; in their response
district.
. Vertical and horizontal fire spread wjJJ be severe in buildings
without sprinklers and adequate compartmentation.
.
Unprotected stairways are always dangerous.
. AlwajS plan for your escape, poor visibility is assured.
. The "buddy system" works and must be utilized.
· Linen cabinet hose is not a good substitute for fire department
attack hose.
. "Nben using a standpipe system, always use the standpipe from the
floor below the fire so firefighters can use the hose as an escape
route.
. Physical fitness is a necessary survival asset.
. Full turnout gear and SCBA are an essential part of safety.
. Helmet chin straps must be utilized at all times.
II The proper use of self-contained breathing apparatus saves lives.
.
When SCBA alarm goes off, get out immediately.
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(J . Proper use of the Incident Command System is vital to safety and ~
'I<>l~...-t.r organization on the fireground. \.;
. It is important to formally establish command and/or assignments.
,'.
.' It is important to know who is in charge.
. Plan ahead, have necessary suppression tools and equipment at
hand. '
, '
. High-rise rll"eS require a heavy commitment of personnel' and
equipment early in the incident.
. Be prepared to ,effect aerial ladder rescue. '
. Inspection of 'a building must be made prior to occupancy to make
sure that al] systems are operational and that they meet the needs of
the Fire Department.
. Building fire protection systems must be tested regularly.
. Building ?Ccupants must be trained to report fires promp,tly.
1 J,0-
II Radio discipline is important. ~
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BURNING QUESTIONS,
PART 1
Random
Thoughts
BY
TOM
BRENNAN
i
I
I AM TRYING TO RECONCILE THE 1 chance Co commicco che insid.o: of Ihe sll1JC. Ihose in the rellr of stores are steel-plolled
fact that more firefighlers are being [ture before il "blows." ; and are bricked and cemented-blocked over.
"burned up" in teday"s fire service than I This fact is combined wilh several olhcr , Skylights are removed in favor of replaced.
ever before. Sure. we lost a grealer I factors to show thaI we are operating in an : additional. and nimsier roofing materials.
annual average of firefighters in line-of- I unconlrolled fire building envelope more . lexan& (\'inually unbreakable clear panels)
duty deaths in past years. But We never; now than at any olher time in the history of is inslalled in windows and commercial
crapped and burned chern so horribly before. ; firelighling. interior partitions in liquor stores and olher
Did you ever give thut a though I or brain- ; occupancies known as burglary "hits:'
storm this topic at a drill? Or. do you still ' CDmbustibility Wooden panels of plywood, known as HUD
avoid the subject like the mlljority who: "Things" that have a function in house- (Housing and Urban Development) wood
are Ih:IOHullhllt ic isn't them? Let's lOSS' holds and blJ..incssl:s such as chniTs. drapes, paneling, are bolted into window openings
out some strictly random ideas, rugs. bedding. countertop~. files-just 10 of strocturcs undergoing occupancy changes
name a few-are marc. combuslible and and which are momenlarily vacant (pieces
Earlier bum haller/faster than in Ihe days of yore. . of junk).
We aT,;"e earlier than in Ihe old days. They aTC plaslic bombs, TIle BTU product
ThaI is a good thing for rescue operations of one pound of household functioning
but a bad Ihing for "prior-to-nashovcr" hems could only give off 8.000 of these lit-
potential. 1 believe that in Ihe old days, the ' lie devils years ago. But the same prod-
lire companmenl or room already hnd time . ucts-plastic this lime-give off mOre Ihan
10 nash if "it wanted 10" before we arrived. 17.000 BTUs per pound today. The nddi-
Replacemcm of alarm boxes wilh lele- lional conlents get holler faster and creale
phones and making telephones a necessity the ignitable gases
for Ihe nation's poor give us quicker notice Ihat are forced oul
of discovery and beller local ions 10 our dis- of the unburned prod-
palchcrs 10 relay to responding units-all ucts sUlTounding the
facls Ihal PUI us at and in Ihe lire building lire Ihat is so ncces-
earlier. sary for the rooml
Anothr.r reason is the install:lIion of early enclosure conlents
warning deleclors, especially the au 10m at- to f1 ash over (re-
ic/monilored Iype. The lire is cenainly dis- member'?).
covered earlier than eVer before. h is good .
that morc and more civilians Me warned in Building CanUrucUan
enough lime to escape. bul we generally' Energy-efficient
arrive prior to flashover probabilities as the buildings hold the
heal and reradialed heat are reciprocally heat longcr. As a
building over time a condition deadly 10 mailer of fact, even when we think we have accompany loca\ collapse OCCUlTing only
humans. Only now, we have more of a . "gonen" some fire companment windows. rooms away from the operalions area, The
, we fail because of unknown double- and only lhings that will warn you of flashover
. TOM BRENNAN has more than J:i years of ' triple-pane window installations. Fire refuses probabilily in the building compartment in
fire ~rvice experience, His career spans more than : to vent itself for a much longer lime than .....hich you are operating is the rapid heal
20 YCMS whh the Fire Department of New York i ever before. buildup of the impending event on the
as well as four years as chief of the Waterbury I flesh on your hands, neck, and other (acial
(CD Fire Department. He was the editor of Firt /' Security skin. Nor your tars. We no longer can use
Enginuring Cor eight years and curren,l)' is a lech- Security-conscious America has begun ' Ihese warnings of impending nashover
nical editor. He is co-edilOC of Tht Firt Chitls I building "~afes" in which to live and do , while inside a burning structUre while we
lIondbook, Fifth Edition (FLtC Engineering Books, ! business. All membranes easily fractured by ! are wearing gloves and other fire clolhing
1995). He is the recipient of the 1998 Fiu EnS;- I fire or firefighters are also easily fraclured : we are mandated to wear "at all limes."
nuring Lifelime Achievernenl A.....ard. l by unwanled intruders. Roof openings nnd I More ideas next time. .
I
I
lack of Awareness of Changing Conditlonl
One of the drawbacks of being "wrapped"
so well in space-age fire clothing is lhat it
is becoming impossible for the firefighler
10 detect rapid heal changes in his environ-
ment or 10 detect Ihe subtle noises that
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: 'IT IS BECOMING IMPOSSIBLE.:'FOR >:'Y.:,.-;f
: .THirFlREfaGIriE~'To'DmcfRAPID1':;~'~1
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.,' H~tCHANGE,$'I.N ,"I$j:~VIRON~ENt~~:
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,;,})~ !~~ ~E:I'~CT ~E, ~P~lL.E: N9,.,$~~: ;p;::
. '~THAT'~CcotvipANY:ioCAl;',COLiApSE;,~~';~'
;.. ':O~ClJ~'RI~G 'O~iY~Jt90MS'~'AW4'''~' ,; /,;>;',;'
". . :.. . , . ,'. . ~'. , . ~ .,'.. . 'I' . . . +.! . . ; ~ '. '..." ,. .
';. FROM ,THE OPERATIONS 'AREA'.' '.:', ".. ::.,:'j~
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132 April 1999 FIREENGlNEERING
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BURNING QUESTIONS,
PART 2
WE WILL CONTINUE WITH 'I in a training scenario w[lhin building
our list of some of the faClors cnclosurcs. lhey bunch up in "e1OlS" and
thlll arc contributing to the move to vl:ry random locations very. very
growing number of firelighters slowly. The same factors cause the hose-
who are being s:riously burned in today'~ lines 10 slow down also. A bad ching.
fire service. Flashover prevention depends on cooling
nHucrials imiidl: the fire comp:mment as
Position quickly as possible, Rapid access and
Firefighlers arc inside 1I1ese structures rapid cooling .....iII shut down [he ignicion
in positive-pressure Nomex& balls, If )'OU i tcmperature g:lses issuing from com-
combine this with positive.pressure fans at i bustibles thaI fuel flashover and will
the onset of operalions. loday's Iirefighlcr ! make nashovcr a nonevent.
ill extremely comfonabk compared wilh :
his father's fire service as wdl as his Number of Personnel
gr:lndfalher's, There is generally no per-: Oopsl We can go on forever here. If you
sonal di~tress reason for loday's !opace age ' want to run ambulances. painl sidcwalks.
fircfighler 10 crawl along the wall of lhe ! PUI on fire prevcnlion shows, run cour~e!i
inside of a fire building. Al l1ashovcr. the i and ~eminars for civilians. ~rfonn building
onl)' survival lechnique (10 give you llnj' i inspeclion. inslall smoke delectors. and allY
chance for survival escape) is if )'OU delecl I olher "new" mission of the fire service. Ihen
lhatlhe back areas of ~'our body arc b!:gin- I <;Ia(fing doesn'l me:ln squat. BUl if }'DU
nlng 10 burn \\hile you O\n: fllcc down on ; ho\'e 10 fight one
Ihl: noor. If Ihe phenomenon occurs and ' nr~ inside :I slruc.
~'ou arc on your feel. Ihere is no cscape. : lure--or )'OU "wan I"
;\'O.VE. If I leave one [hough I-and on If : 10 fig-hllhe fire from
one-with my brolher :JOd siSler firefight- ~ in~ide because of
crs as I leave eanh. it would be Ihis: "If: the life hazard
\'ou cannol sce. CRAWU" That one faCI jlknown. scen. or
\\'1 II savc h\'cs and prc\'enl man)' p;unCul ~u~~"'led~.lhen Maff.
und disabling injuries. : ing is mandutory.
1 And I don'l care
"Retarded Operillionsft I ",hallht: rctired Iirefighlers (queslion:lble III
We arc moving slower inliide Ihese I1esll who have now become paid consul-
burning structures because of mandatory lanls in a world Ihey now spil on sa)'. as
(a ~ood thin~1 musk policy. Ii you have! Ihe)' tell elected officials lbudgel decision
an opPoTlunilY to obllerve fully encupsu- : makersllhO\I personnel can be reduced more
1:lIed and posilive-pressured firefigtlll'rs ) and mOlc unljl only Ihe lruck arrives
I brought there by a driver and no firefight-
ers,
The buildin~ musl be made 10 behave
b.:COlc n:Jshoyer llnd olher phenomena like
rollover and panial collapse and cold smoke
e"plesions occur.
The funclions 10 suppor! the inward
mo~'emenl of II handline must be ongojn~
1I11 lit once-nol "nickeled and dimed" and
lhe random choices of one or two Iirelight-
ers who for some reason didn't gel a chance
BY TOM BRENNAN
I
[10 "grab a nozzle"!
I Vcnlilalion is a lo~t an because Ihe fire-
II fightcr doesn't need il any more and, in fact.
not enough firefighters arrive on Ihe scene
~ :JII tIt once 10 make il effective. BUI Ihe
l building needs conlrolled ventilation before
; il explodes and puts unaware. bUI prolecled.
; Iircfighll:rs il1lo oblivion.IPOlilicians have
; wen laId by Ihese presli/u' anal expertS lnal
: ncw lighlweighl. smallcr-dlameter hoselines
, C;Jn be slretched with f.. wer pc rsonne I.
Sure! But inlerior oper.lliolt of thot handline
, need~ Ihe supeT\'i~ed. coopenuh'e opera-
tional ~peed of a minimum of three Iirclight-
crs and one oflicer \\ho docsn'l have II super.
gloved h:md on the hose himself.
Anolher (<leI: Small-d;ameler hose mu,~1
move forward in the fircfight, If Ihe fire
! Slaps it, there is no holding aClion possible
: with Ihis type of hose-Ihe fire wins! The
: answer is simple: You mllst gel OJ b;u:kup
:', ~,'''~E~V~,:~~~':~~~~~j~,)~~r~9~~!I!~
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'<,ANI) I',REVENT',MANV PJUN~'" 'AND~~:
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. TOM BRENNAN h~s mUle than 3~ )'ear~ of
Ore scl"o'ice ellperience. His career ~ram mort: lh:m
:m )'ellfS .....ilh Ihe Fire Ckpanmenr of New York
a~ well :IS (our years as chier o( lht: Walcrbury
(CTl Fire Dc":lnmcm, He w~s Ihe editor or Fir"
EI/,~i/l('l'rirr.~ ror ci1!hl )'c:m. :md cun-eml)' i~ a lech.
nical edilor. He ;s co.edi,or or Thr Fi/'(' Chir!1
Halldhool:. Fifth EditiolllFire Engineering BOCl~S.
199~1, He is the redpiem of Ihe 1998 Firr ElIgi.
/I('rrillR Lirelime Achic\'ement Award.
I limo' or wmtlrt'r IWSI'lillr of lar~u diolllrtel'.
J From whcre~ Where lire the personnel'?
I
I And we arc worrying about rapid inlerven-
: lion sUjli:r entry and rescue teams, You can-
nm Iighl a ~lrUClure fire for any amouOI of
lime .....i1h four lilcJighlers inside and four
, Iirelighlcrs olltside who are held in ,'heck
: and made ready to jump into a dcgrading
, condilioll thallhe)'. 100, cannol conlTol. So.
: PUI all Ihese reasons. and others you muy
I think of. IOl:elher. and we will continue 10
1 burn our n-rcfighlers more horribly Ihan
cver before. cven though we lire going to
~ fewer Iires and arc beller protecled than al
I an)' lime in hislor)'. Lcarn 10 make the
I worJ..pluce-the it1f{'I';ol' of tilt fil't! blli/d-
, ill",~are! .
I '
140 May 1999 F1REENGlNEERING
1
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o. ' I
Rescue .Helps Move Mayor.
Atlanta L~cal Capitalizes on FF's 15 Minutes
Wheo Allanta local 134 member
Matt Moseley was lowered from a
helicopler to rescue cmne operator
Ivers Sims, he was only worned
about getting out safely, He had no
idea that his actions would set off
a chain of events that brought
Atlanta Mayor eill CampbeU to. at
long last, confront problems in" the
City's fire department.
Atlanta Professional Fire
Fighter.;: presidenl Da\'id Rhodes
and oiliers met wiili Campbell just
two days afler Moseley's April 12
rescue, which was widely covered
in the national press,
"The mayor made iI clear thaI be
wanled 10 mend old wounds and
move ahead," Rhodes said, "He
asked to meet with us and we
accepted:'
The meeting was clCtremely pro.
dUClive for the local. The mayor
promilied fire fighters:
· a bonus to make up for the loss of
pay parity with police for 1999,
and then to rescore pay parity in
Ihe 2000 budget
· the replacement of the current
breathing apparatus no later than
Aug. 31.1999
.. . .. - ~ ...... -l....
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. safe staffing levels of al least
four fIre fighter.;: per apparatus
. a quick resolution to the delay io
apparatus purchases,
'There is a clean slale between
the mayor and Ihis or .:;anizaLion
today," Rhodes said at a news con-
ference afterward.
Campbell agreed: "Some limes
the lhings that are the simplest arc
overlooked, Hke good, healthy dia.
logue, some1hing we haven' 1 had
and I take responsibilily for that,"
When Moseley llppearCd with the
Mayor on lbe Today show the day
after the rescue, be told Caml"'>C1l
that he should meet wilh Local ,
134. Moseley, an active and vocal
!ll.cmber of the union. hoped the
events could help change things
betweeo the city administration
and fare fighlers,
Moseley also thanked Vice
Presidenl AI Gore for his congnu-
ulatory call and his long.lime sup.
port of fire fighters and the IAFF,
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TO MARKET, TO MARKET
, , OUR TROUBLE IS WE DON'T KNOW HOW TO MAR.
UI ourselves," So goes the common lament. The (ire
service's political torpor is its undoing in a decidedly
political world. But there are isolated pockcts of mar-
keting success "tories that bear emulation and study.
Take recent events in Arlanla. 1n thar city, the relationship
between the mayor and the local firefighters union was less than
ideal. For six years, the mayor refused (ace-to.face communications
with u. . ..on leadership on critical lire department issues.
This pasl April. the Allanla Fire Department responded to a firc
in a mill building under reconstruction. Numr.rous factors. includ-
ing heavy winds, low humidity. and oil.saturated structural mem-
bers, hastened fire spread, resulting in a huge fire with the potential
for a frue connagrafion. .
The fire trapped a tower crane operator some 200 feet above the
fire. Flames impinged on the base of the crane. Radiant heal isniled
the operalor c:!b. Perched on concrete counlerweights at the farthest
end of the crane. the operalor's feet burned through his shoes.
The only path of rescue was from above. The incidenl commander
marshaled a helicopler suiLable for the task. Firefighter M:1lt Mose-
ley. Atlanta Fire Dcpanment Squad 4. was directed 10 make the pick.
The rest, as they say, is history. Countless television viewcrs
nationwide wilnessed an expert and courageous rescue performed
by Moseley and the helicoplcrcrew.
Back in quaners. Moseley was the center of local and national
media attention. The mayor arrived for a photo opportunity. Mose.
Icy posed with Ihe mayor but delivered :i pointed message thaI he
was uncomfortable being seen with a mayor who had ignored his
firelighlers. This did not go unnoticed.
"Matt is 11 double hero," said Lieutenant David Rhodes, presidenl
orlhe Atlanta Prof~ssional Fire Fighlers Local 134. "This was more
than just a rescue. It would have been easy for him 10 jusI sit back
and enjoy his 10 minutes of fame, but he took the iniliative to lalk
man-to.man with the mayor:'
Meanwhile, the public reacled 10 the successful response. "Wilh-
in IS minutes of the rescue, people were calling radio talk shows
and laking up our cause," said Rhodes. 'They wt're asking, Will the
firelighters get their r:lise now? Will they gel new gear? Will they
gellheir bre.Uhing apparallJli'!"
During the year.and-a-half of Rhodes' tenure as president. Ihe
union had heavily marketed its causes Ihrough the media. BUlthetc
were no tangible results from that effort-until "the rescue."
"After Ihis rescue, we didn't have to do any thing-I he public did
it for us. lI's like the movie actur who becomes an 'ovemighl suc-
cess' even though he's been preparing for 20 years," said Rhodes.
"We prepped the public. As soon as we had lhis media exposure, we
found the public had been listening all along. They knew our issues,
but it took a high-profile evenlto gel them to rally behind us."
"EVen though it Seems like you're not gaining ground, you have
to get your message out there conlinually, so when the big event
Editor's
Opinion
BY BILL MANNINg.
I ,
happens, the public is prepped. We turned the incidenl into a pow.
erful 1001 fo move the lire service ahead. To me, thaf's a bigger
accomplishment than the rescue itself:'
Thanks to aggressive marketing and a firelighter's postincid.:nt
gumption, within hours the mayor sat down with the firelighters 10
discuss issues. Some have already been addressed, and some are
slill in the process. There is forward motion. Lest we forgel, the
road to political progress is paved with incremental viclories.
I "Public opinion equals political aelion:' s:!id Rhodes. "If you
J don't invest [in marketing your depanmentl, then you have 10 t:lke
I what you're given."
l For too long, the lire service has laken whal it's been given. For
! too long, it has failed to successfully champion its own cause. For
I too many who count themselves among the "leadership," aggressive:
1 marketing comes at too greal a personal risk. Too many leaders
, look in Ihe mirror. slide up Ihe Windsor knot. and admire the "pub-
i lie safely executive" Slating back. as far removed from the "doing"
; side of Ihe fire business as they can get. incapable of marketing Ihe
r true needs of their people on Ihe front lines. As Tom Brennan said
: so well, "If you ean market your tactics, you cnn market your pea-
l pIc. You have to know [lirelightingl to markel."
i For too many fire depal1ments, the only gains come in knce-jl'l'k
: rc:!ction (0 a horrible tragedy. They showed in Allant.1 il doem',
; have to be that way.
! Special Alert: Currently the FIRE Act is in Ihe Subcommiueeon
. Basic: RcsellfCh 'wilhin Ihe House Commiuee on Science. 11 will sit
. there until Ihe subcommillee decides to hold hearings on the bill-
: Ihe next step in the legislative process. As of this writing, Commit-
i tee Chairman Ja~es Sensenbrenner (R-Wl) has ignored requests 10
i hold hearings. Many key Republican leaders are not keen on lhis
I bill. If hearings are not held, the bill cannOI make it oul of subcom.
I minee. and il will die Ihis legislalive session.
I It is time to market. Conli\CI members of the Subcomminee on
j Basic Research by phone or mail, post haste, and express your sup-
I' port for the ARE Act. Action from conslituents of the subcommit-
lee members is especially critical. Make your voice heard now, and
i help detennine your own fUlure. .
I' SUBCOMMITIEE ON BASIC RESEARCH
Rep. Nick Srnilh (R-MI), Chairman Rep. John a.Larson 10-C11
1 Rep. Sherwood L. Bochlen (R.NY) Rep. Thomas W. Ewing (R.n..)
Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson (0.1">:) Rep. Lynn N. Rivers (O.MII
I Rep. CaR~unce A. Morella {R.MD} Rep. Frank D. Lucas (R.OK)
Rep. Bob Etheridge (O-Ne) Rep. Michael F. Doyle (D.PA)
Rep_ Lnmar Smilh (R-TX) Rep. Judy Biggen (R-ll.)
Rep. Lynn C. Woolsey (O-CA) Rep. George E. Bro"''Il. Jr. (O.CAI
Rep. ail GUlknechtIR.MN) Rep. F. James Senscnbrenner (R.Wl)
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Editor's
Opinion
THE NEW
ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM
B Y B ILL M IJ N N.-J N C
WE ALL KNOW FIREGROUND COMMANDERS I cannot fullill his function as a working s/lpcn'i5or-not a work-
must have melhods to account immediately for per- I er-Ihen the men' and women on Ihe line arc gric\'ously short-
sonnel on a fireground or other incident scene. And ' changed.
in a paramilitary organization, holding members! If you wonder why we conlinue to lose large numbers of lire-
accountable to authority helps ensure that the chain of com- I fighters in burning buildings (I'd like to be able to assume. for
mand is kept intact. which has n direct b:aring on span of con- I argument's sake, thaI the firefighters operating in the building
trol and firefighter safety and effectiveness. , are well-schooled in the art of realfirefighling, but we can't even
Deyond these two accepted definitions of accounlability ("to I be sure of that anymore), in many cases we need to look no fur-
account for" and "be answerable to"). we onen disagrce on the : ther than lireground numbers and company-level supervision,
methods for achieving the goal. But far worse, we are perpetuating! I'Ve heard it said we're being too hard on ourselves and on
the myth that plastic and fasteners can substitute for leadership. ' our chosen systems. What is this, a game of Kick the Can? All
Not too long ago at a national conference, I served as moder- , across,America, we've grown accustomed to reaching for quick-
ator for a distinguished panel on accountability. There were : fix, "systems"based" or hardware solutions for problems that
some interesting ideas brought forth. BUI afterward. I kicked can ani)' be solved by human beings, b)' human behavior. As it
m)'selfbecause I felt I didn't stress t\\'o key points sufficiently. was said in the conference I mentioned, "We bought a s)'stem,
First, the t)'pical accountability system, if properly followed. not a Solulion,"
will give you a quick accounting of who is missing, but il won't We've given up the personal/tc:lm responsibility part of the
necess3rily give you their location-that is, you may get a gen- equation for game-board firefighting, convincing ourselvcs all
eral "last known location," but when the first noor is in the the while thal it will keep us safe and "accounted for:'
basement, all bets are off. A conference attendee said it bluntly, That's really another subtle version of CY A management.
"Accounlability tags are really firefighter dog tags for identifi- Accountabilit)' systems are good tools with Iimit:ltions used as a
cation after the fact:' In a sense, he's right, co vcr-up for at Icast part of what's ailing this fire service, It's
Second. just as many acknowledge that the company omcer much more comfortable for lire managers, aftcr a serious fire-
is the true measule of the fire department, By eXlension, the fighter injury, to hold up a lag system in front of their bosses
company officer is the central figure in the accurate accounting and call it "an unavoidable tragedy" than to accepl responsibili-
of operating personnel. He is the critical link in the span of con- ly for the real problcms on the fircground: lack of experience,
trol from command to troops, , lack of training, lack of communications, lack of resources, and
With the decimation of company stamng over the past 20 lack of company-level accountability-all conditions we have
years, the typical American company officer is forced to com- created ourselves.
pensate by performing procedural necessities that otherwise. The company officer must be given the opportunity to lever-
would have been perfonned by one or two now missing mem- ' age his leadership and fireground managemenl skills where the
bers. And you cannot have full conlrol and full accountability if I rubber meets the road. To do that, he nceds people.
you're elbows-deep in fireground tasks, ! Mayors, city managers, council persons. and, yes. lire chiefs
From somewhere I can hear at least one voice protesting. I are engaged in a vel)' dangerous game. In complicity. they're
"But now the company officer's gOI fewer people to manage!" : rolling the dice, really-betting that firefighter line-of-duty
True, but when you're focused on tasks, tunnel vision is deaths will be spaced far enough apart so that their pa)'out will
inevitable. You're not reading warning signs, Not reading the I be far exceeded by the money saved from CUlling personnel,
building. Not reading the effect of tactics on fire development.: It's high time the dice rollers were held accountable in a new
You're nol focused on yourself, much less two other people , accountability system, one that ascribes blame for a lirefighter
who are your responsibility. death squarely where it belongs.
Compally-Ievel supervision has been sabotaged by the plun- Let's hope when the officer comes to take )'our dog tag,
dering of companies. And not a system or lag or passport in the you're still brenthing. .
world can overcome that.
The company officer has been handed the short stick from 7<://1//1 A . .~
city management and fire chiefs. And if the compan)' officer f:;?U.e.{ {/~ 0
4 July 1999 FIRE ENGINEERING
Safety & Su
A 10')'cnr national study of the
deaths of firefighters operating
inside burning structures revealed
that most firefighters were ~caught or
trapP,ed~ inside thc structures and
killed by names, heat or smoke,
Firefighters can be caught or trapped
by nashover, backdrafis or disorienta.
tion and killed by heOlt or smoke,
In New York City the deadly
national trend of firefighters cought
and trapped unfortunately has kept
pace. For example: in 1994, four fire.
fighters were caught or trapped by fire
inside burning buildings; in 1995, two
firelighters were caught or trapjX'd by
fire inside burning buildings; in 1996,
one fin::fighter was trapf.'('d b,y flre and
killed; in 199B, two fire officers were
killed when they were caught and
trapped in 0. noor collapse; and in 1999,
three firefighters were caught and
trapped by h('..1t smoke and fire in Ule
hallway ofa high.rise building,
I It Jlnppcning?
.J one knows for sure why this
trend of firefighters becoming caught
and trapped by fire continues, but '0
:herc arc se\'eral theories.
i
One theory stales that structures '"
ha'9c become more dangerous during {
:ires. Energy-cilicient reno\'ated struc. ;:
:ures have insuJalcd walls and ceilings,
:lirtight doors and double.paned win.
~ows. This has been described as
described as "tight building s.rTldrome.~
TIwse structures contain fire and heat
for long JX!riexis before disco\'el)'. There
IS little smoke or flame seepage from the
,;tructure during !be gro....-th stage of a
?Iazc. However, when firefighters arrive
m the scene after II delayed discovery
md vent several doors and ....;ndows,
argc amounts of pent-up superheatro
1ame and smoke rapidly spread
,hr'Jughout the hallways, stairs llnd
la.<.sageWa)'S, trapping fircfighteni.
Another theory suggests thnt the
'xcellent protective equipment we
ought so long nnd hard to obtain has
.'inunl Dunn, a rirchous~ contributing
d;' '. a d('put), chiefu'ith tM FD.\'Y (Jnd a
~f 1M Nw' }'ork Cit). FiIT Chiefs
,)/\. Ilr i..~ rM aulhor oflhe books I11ld
Safely And Survival On The Fire.
. .J and ('.ollll~ Of Buminc Buildings.
"or infonnation rolI8O().23J-33SS.
18
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Modem sel{-conl(lincd bn:othing apparatus (SeBA) and encapSl/lafinc proterth,t
gear art permitting firefighters 10 enter smoke.filled areas and search much dour
to heat and flame than elter befort.
a downside. The masks, bunker gear
and hoods that so eITecth'ely protect
us from burns also enable us to cnter
and search burning buildincs faster
and farther, 60metimes gelling us
caught or trapped by fire.
A third tbcory points lo !be I't'<'Cnl
advances in fordble entry tool design,
lelling search and resclIe firelighters
quickly open locked doors nnd enter a
burning structure before a hoscline is in
position and ready to operate, Yet
another throf)' suggests the dentllS are
C<luscd by the reduction in the number
of firefighwrs available on ho.<;{!.slrclch-
ing teams. This has slowt'd Ule place-
ment of hoselines Ulnt olTer protection
lo searching firefighters. Agnin, this is
speculation; no one renlly knows nIl Ule
rca!7ons why firefighters arc caught or
lrnppo.:od during slnlcturc fires,
Today, firefiGhters can crllwl far-
ther and faster into a burning, super-
heated, smoke. filled area than we
could )'enrs ago. Bunker gear with
knee pads, hoods. improved fire.
retarding gloves, wrist protection and
positive.pressure masks enable lire-
fighters to enter smoke.filled areas
nnd search much closer to heal and
name than ever before.
In the past five )'enrs, 17 New
York City firelighter:; ha\'c died in the
line of duty. Tweh'e of them suc-
cumbed to products of combustion -
smoke, heat and name, Three lire-
'~ ~. ~;1.:.'~?;~:~cerilliUriri wJlJ p;~si'.tf ~,.';,.
..1'.,r~CClmmand a~d (oiiiro1 of flres in .
,:.1!,;L?"~ Wo~1I:.},ipmeJundrngl~:al :: .,': ,
'i:~f.~~DU s~,rme;p'~nc~ ~ elYJc!s 'Exp.~:
~'.r:'.~~l99 in Bahimore Juty 2l-:2S.);., '
~l V:J~:'~.::..: .!,,~":}l.'L~.~~;:II':.;~~..}J:~~:~~'{."':~~
Firchou!;eJJul)' 1999
'~';';~':'<lr;;:'(~~':'\':'~ ~':; :>' :;':.L<::'~';~ '::,,::': ~,:'~"',
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~ 'ide Structures :11984~1994l', ',::
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;;.~aug~(or,t,r(!.Pl?cd : ..,,".':113 ~,' : . ;' :~..::' : :<.
:}~~U~~ .~/~;~'~; ;,,~',,~::~::' ::;~.~:~,~::< :;':'~lt~.~:..~:, '~;:' '~,:L;?
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f~~iii~f;~c:r;{~J~::;:,'y~~:,j(
fighters were trapped above n fire; one
was trapped searching in an apart-
ment above a swre; one became lost in
n ccllnr fire; another was trapped in a
room ....ith barred windows; two oth-
crs were dropped into a fire when a
floor collapsoo; and four were killed in
hn 11 ways of fire-resistive high.rise
buildings. The causc of nil these
deaths can be attributed to products
of combustion.
Dnngerous Tnctlc8
Most firc chiers believc fire.
fighters have received the maxi-
mum protection from protecli\'e
dothing, nnd now there must be
n change in firefighting L'lclics.
All firefighting docs not prcsenL
thc same danger. Some tactics
Me mOTe dangerous than others.
Firefighters must be a.....are of
the most dangerous lnclics. For
example, searching for the lOOl'
tion or a fire on arrival at the
seenc, before a hoseline is in oper-
ation, is one or the most danger-
ous tactics. And operating ahovc a
fire, as a routinc slnndard operat-
ing procedure, is another high-
risk tactic that must be reexamined.
Both of these tactics have firefighters
searching in n fire- and smoke.filled
area without the protection or a hose
strcam. During this search, they can
bccorne disoriented in smoke, nnd
trapped by fire. heal or eX'Jllosions.
In recent years, many dties have
reduced the number of firefighters
who stretch hoselines, and thereby
make firefighting more deadly. And at
"
I ' ", '
Add're'alism
to, Y' 0 U r::': ~ ,
rescue"
t r'a i.n i:n'g :,
exercises,
p. . ~. - .. 11-...,
Simulates
the weight
of an
unconscious
victim
lhe same Urnc, thesc cities have
increased the number or firelighU:!ra
who perform high-risk operations,
such ns searching before n hoseline is
in operation, Most fire departments
ha\'e increased or kept consL'Int the
response or firefighters assignE'd to
ladder com panics, squad companies
and r['seue compnnics.
A study of one large fire depart.
ment rcvealed that at working fires
only 12 firelighters stretch protective
hoselincs while 24 fireliehters per-
form high.risk search nnd rescue
operations. Some fire chiers, myselr
included, believe firefighting might be
less cll\ngcrous if the numbers were
reversed; for example, if 24 firelight-
ers nrc available w strd.ch hoselines
and only 12 available to perfonn high.
risk search. Fewer firefighters would
be at risk or being caught or trapped.
Fire chiefs have also known tac-
tics that are carried out alone, ....;lh.
out a partner, prescnt more danger.
Also tactics that are not frequently
pcrfonned also present greJler risk,
especially if training is not g1\"cn to
fuel'ighlcrs in that area.
Yea
issued:
ratus I
protecti
to senTi
can tOI
reach r
Smoke
Ole fire
or fi rl!.
eyes, ru
He.
menl.
we rl! r.
doorw;
burner
humin
ing fr,.
sweepl
~ fighter
.' noor:
proved
fi refigh
Fin
wheth(
(c:aughl
wi thot
. worth
..
Anoth.
It''I"-,
Port.
CaliL
-
Kit
With t1
meaSI
wilhol
Pro
~ _."!'"t-r,4'~~~ _...........~... .~.. c,.., '\.IIII"T...........-..n...,
avo
It!rs
m~,
Years ago, before fU"Clighters were
issued self-ronlained breathing appa.
ratus (SCBA) and OSHA.designed
protective clothing, they were not able
to search as far inlD fire areas as they
Clln today, and they were not able
retlch the {loor above a fire as rapidly.
SmoKe and hent prC\'ent~d it. \\'hen
the firefichtcr entered n hall or room
of {ire, smoke particles burned the
C)'cs. and caused gagging and choking.
Hcat also stopped forward move.
ment. Without masks, firefighters
were forced to {ight a fire from the
doorv..ay until most of the contents
bumed away. It was called controlled
burning. Also, smoke and heat issu.
ing from the fire apartment and
sweeping up the stairs caused fire-
fighters to delay the search on the
Ooor abo\'e until conditions im.
proved. Smoke and beat do not skip
lircfight.ers today.
Fire departments must deLcnnine
whether the cost of firefight.er deaths
(caught and trapped) duc kI searching
without protection of a haseline is
worth the benefits of victims rescued.
Another question fire departments
110
nica
'art.
tirea
1h'c
Today',
tncap,ulat.
td {ir-rficht.
trs art
unable 10
dettr1l1i fU!
the lemptr.
a/uN! of/he
smoke in a
{ire build.
ing. whieh
can be a.,
hot a.s
1,000
degrees
Fahrenheit.
must ask is how far inkl a superheat-
ed area should a firefighter crawl?
The aggressive interior attack we
br3gged (and mostly exaggerated)
about years ago has become n routine
t.actic today.
Based on the above firefighter
fatality statistics, here arc several
suggestions to make firefighting less
dangerous:
· Increase the number firefight-ers
on engine companies responding to
fires, so protective hoselines can be
stret.chl>d fnsLcr and more frequently.
· Change the rntio of responding
engines kllndders, squads and rescue
companies.
· Delay firefighters from ent.ering
a superhealcd, smoke.filled hallway
or apartment until a hoseline is in
position. And delay going above a fire
until the fire is "knocked down."
· Do not n Ilow n re ngh te rs to
search alone.
· Train firefighl.crs not to search
in superheated fire areas beyond a
~point of no return"; that is, n maxi-
mum distance beyond .....hich n fire-
fighter should not proceed into a
smoke- and heat.filled nrea without
the protection of a haseline.
· Provide firefighters with heat.
sensitive equipment to warn them
when the atmosphere they arc enter-
ing is too hot. Todays encapsulated
firefighters arc unable to determine
the temperature of the smoke.
Smoke can be hot, as hot as ] ,000
degrees F'ahrenheit. With the ne.....
protective clothing, when firefighters
feel the heat, it is alread)' too late.
They arc burned. ~
",1:t'ireground Tactics By JOHN NORMAN
Why Are High-Rise Fires
Killing & Injuring People?
T hrcc fires in high-rise apartment
. buildings lale in 1998 challenged
New York City firefighters to the
extreme. Three firefighters and four
civnians died in these blazes, and
d07.ens of firefighters and civilians
were injured, including one serious
firefighter injury that may result in a
disability retirement.
In a city that has over 5,000 high-
rise apartment buildings and 1,000
high-rise office buildings, high-rise
fU'es are nothing out of the ordinary.
What is out of the ordinary is the mun-
ber of injuries and deaths, particularly
firefighter deaths, in buildings that are
normally considered relatively "safe" or
"routine." These were definitely not
"routine," They were unique fires.
"Blo\\1orch" Fires
New York City has experienced
similarly severe conditions in these
'~s of buildings periodically since the
) )5. The fire department's fircfight-
,t procedures manual, Multiple
Dwelling Fires, which was ....Tilten in
1979, described, these fires as "blow.
c
g
2:
c
$:.
o
-.
~
..
o
5
L;
a.
John Norman. a Firehousc<!;l contribut.
ing editor, was rtcent/y promoted 10 bal-
lalion chief in the FDNY. He prelJious/y
u'as the caploin of Rescue Company 1 in
llhaHan. Norman is a/:;o an inslruc-
at the Nassau County, NY, Fire
uice Academy and /eclures nationall)'
)1 tire and rescue topics. He is the author
of Fire Officer's Handbook of Tactics,
which may be ordered by calling BOO.
752.9768.
30
torch" fires, and describes l3dics to be
implemented when encountering this
condition. 'The cause OfOlis condition is
high winds blo\l.ing flame buck into the
building through windows which have
'vented.
The blowtorch description is quite
accurate. 'The wind-drh'en flames blast
out of the apartment door at exiremely
high velocity. The wind striking the
side of the building funnels
though an involved apart-
ment, increasing the amount
of oX)'gen in contad with the
fuel, resulting in a dramatic
increase in the burning rate
of an object. The resulting
flame is then pushed by the
wind, venting out of the
apartment door and filling
the public hall with flame.
The fireball must have nn
exhaust outlet or the airflow
cannot continue, but in a
high-rise building there are
numerous possibilities.
Windows in the hnllway
can be open or may fail due to
heat. In several cases, win-
dows which were open in
apartments across the public hall, over
100 feet from the fire apartment, pro-
vided the necessary exhaust outlet.
when the occupants opened the apart-
ment door to flee.
Of course, when the fire depart-
ment deploys a hoseline onto lhe fire
floor from the stairway, Ole door to the
stairway becomes blocked open and the
stnirca~e itself becomes n chimney.
.
This situation is worsened if the door
at the top OrOle staircase is open to the
exterior, a practice that is routinely
used under less severe conditions in
order to lessen the contamination of
the staircase and upper noors due to
mushrooming.
If the ....ind is not blowing into the
windows of the fire apartment, fires in
"fireproof" residences arc usually extin-
guished rather ~routi.nely" by a single
hoscline, since the fire loading in a typi.
~'ll apartment is relatively light. During
a "routinc" fire, smoke in the stairs and
upper floors is the prime thrcalto oa:u-
pants and is easily combated by venting
the top of the stair and elevator shafts.
In se\'cre conditions, however, the
threat is actunlllame and high heat,
and venting the sLnir can ser.'e to draw
the fire to that stair.
Tactic; to be used when faced ....ith
such severe conditions have been limit-
ed. If the fire is ....ilhin reach of an out.
side stream, it may be best to knock it
down from outside.
In most of the past incidents of this
type, multiple 2~inch hllJ'ldlincs oper-
ating from the staircases have been
unable to ad\'ance due to the flames
blo\\ing at them. The hnndlines have
no effect on the fire under these cir.
cumstances because all the water that
"
"
Firehouse/July 1999 b
.....
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~E~~
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...
ULTRAsourm INTERCOM
Interfaces with AU Mobile Radios.
Slmurtaneous transmission on
2 radios. Up to 12, voice activat-
ed intercom positions.
~f;I~~.;:
S..A..f..E
Ideal Intercom for Ambulance, Mobile
Command Centers. Marine. and
Airport vehicles.
.~:'. 'I.... .OJ'-. .0. I :" \'~ .~<\ .....;;.:
, .... ....~.. :': OTHER PRODUcrc:" '::'''..;~i .
~.... ....\ .c. .,." " ~ ...~ ...~.
:~ Digita1.VoJc~F\!<o,rde~ ':'(~ ';:. ~ ' ~'~:, :
.fMot)ne ~",di~ '.nt~rface. Mgdul~~ '
~.:~eJtm.Heads~t q..br~!, }<~':-:'. " ::
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Stafnfess
Steel Bandl
V Comfortable
V Dependable
V NFPA 1500
V' Flex Boom,'
V" Rugged
..... Quiet
32
they throw is not reaching the ruel,
where it can cool it and stop further
Dl1I11e production.
Under these extreme circum.
stances, an inwrior handline attack
typically invoh'cs eight to 12 engine
companies operating in relays, since
firefighters can spend only a minute or
two in the hall before they are burned
by the high temperature soaking
though their protective clothing. No
real progress is made in advancing an
Ole fire, despite the terrible beating the
personnel are laking, until the fire has
consumed a bulk of the combustibles in
the fire area and has began to decay.
The t)-pical result is that once this
I state is reached, and the lines can
Bd\'ance to the door of the fire apart-
ment, one line inside the apartment
readily completes extinguishment. The
only objects remaining at this point arc
those made of steel, since even alu.
minum objects are found as pools of
metal on the Ooor. The fire has burnt
itself out!
One option that might be possible
under these circwnstanccs would be to
have the haseline remain behind fire--
resistive barriers right up untit the
point it is about to attack. This may be
possible if the staircase is on the same
side of the hall as the fire apartmenL If
that is the situation, you can breach a
hole through a ooncrcte black or gypsum
plank stair enclosu.ro. Continue breach-
ing through walts until you have
reached the fire apartme nt, then create
a very small hole in the wall, only large
enough to stick the nozzle tip through,
and then open up on it. Making this
hole close to the outer wall on the \\ind-
ward side will lessen the lendency for
fire to blow through the wall at the
attack team when the final hole is
made, especially if the windows in the
adjacent apartment are opened, allow-
ing the wind to be pressuriz.ed that
apartment equally w the fire apart.
menl 'Ibis t.eclmique will not be possi-
ble if the staircase walls arc made of
powro concrete as is sometimes done to
add resistance to B building's structure.
Another possible tactic that may
work is to pressuriz.e the attack stair
behind tho engine company, using fans
or blowers. The difficulty here is main.
taining a sufficient positive pressure in
the ftrc fioor in the face of numerous
open slair doors, espcciatty if the roof
door is opened. To date, this has not
proven successful, although ongoing
research in Canada shows subst.'l11tiaJ
promise in this orca.
Two further options may exist.
When the fire is above the reach of
ground mounted or nerial streams,
consider the modified Navy fog applica-
I tor (see Firehouse@, May 1998) from
either the floor above or below the fire,
or a Bresnan distributor lowered from
7'ht hich-rin curtain rIc..e& not hamper an
aUack, if the handline or positive-pres-
sure {anI are pushing (rom i",Uk. The
curtain billolV$ out fa allow smoke, heat
and caul to escape.
Ute Door or two above to a point where
it is in line with the venled windows.
In the case of the Bresnan, one
half of the water discharged will not
go into the window, but since the 2~
inch Bresnan flows 350 to 480 gpm,
this should not a major problem. The
fire loading in the apartment is not
that heavy, it just takes the waler in
the right place. 'nle modified applica-
tor ....ill put all of its 175 gpm inlo the
fire apartment right at the location
where it is going 00 do the most good
and then the ....ind "ill carry the fine
fog droplets through the apartment
and down the hall.
The last option we y,ill discuss may
well be the simplest of all. Since the
wind blowing in throueh the windows
is the problem, the solution is to slop
the windlIn March 1999, the New
York City Fire Department began
experimenting with a high.tempera-
ture lire-resistive curta.in that can be
lowered from a ....indow above the one
that has failed. Initial testing has
shown a great deal of promise. In the
words of one group of firefighlers who
were in a hallway dwing one oCthe fire
tests, when the curtain was dropped,
"It was like somebody threw B switch
and turned the fire off.~
0: course, the proven best way to
literally "turn the fire off' is to install
wet-pipe automatic sprinklers
throughout these buildings. In the
aftermath of the December 1998
tragedies, the City of New York had
taken steps to do just that. Beginning
in March 1999, all new residential
structures housing more than three
families wilt have to be fulty sprin-
klered and any existing buildings
modified to O\'cr 50% of the value of
the residential portions of such build.
ing must be retrofitted with sprin-
klers 85 well. That is a step
that will renlly save Uves. ~
FlrehousclJul)' 1999
.(
.'.
;.
1,
~
'....'
r'
,.
"
Saur~bury I
re~cuc veh
design ant
the fines! I
Doesn'l yc
[lrC loo~ln~
vcnlcle m~
e.r.<lct spec
rcally only
10 Cillr 5.1,
PO Box (
HIGH-RISE
FIREFIGHTING AND
STANDPIPE TRAINING
PREPARING YOUR FIREFIGHTERS FOR THE WORST
B Y D A V I D M. M c G It A I L
As WE NEAR THE END OF ANOTHER DECADE, WE
can look bJck al se\'eral yean of fire service statistics. The
statbtic lhat alwa)'s sticls oul in my mind is the number
of firefighlers injured or lill~d ~hik operaling inside
burning buildings. In facl, ~ hen 1 stan~d preparing this
article, eighl firefighters had lostlhcir lives in various high.rise fires
Ihroughoullhe COUIllr)' since 1991. Before the anicle was completed.
a Irugic high.rise lire in Brook1)'n. r\cw York. clJimed the lives of
three more brave men. Unfortunately, Ihc)' will probably not be Ihe
,
_....._--_.~---_.- ------
. DAVID M. MeGRAU..:I 17')'ear \'eler.m of the rire ser.-j~e. is a captain: laSl firefighters to die in high.rise building fires.
Wilh lhc: Dcn\'er (CO) Fire Dcp~nmenllOFD), The depanmenl's high.rise i There is no, "fire service cryslal bJII" 10 predict when or where
inwuctor since 1993, he rcccnlly imrlemenled a new Hi&h.Ri~e Fire Ilhe nexl serious high.rise lire will occur. Therefore. we arc left wilh
FiJ;h1inS Equiprnenl Pac~age. which he dc\'elo~d.;md lM aswcialed high. only one thing: PREPARA TlO~! We must always prepare for the
ri~e op.:ralion~ traininG for thc depanmcnl. He in~lnJcu on high.rise o~ra' ! high-rise operalion beeau~e il ma)' occur an)'lime. and anywhere. In
tions at the local. Uate. and nalionallc:, cis: ha~ been an in~lruclor .....i1h the I Ihe fire service, lhe .....ord prl'{wralinn is synonymous with safNY,
lire ~d~nce prOfr;JfT' at Red Rocks Communil)' Collcpe ~ince 1991: and The mOSl crilicul componenls of any fireground operalion arc
~l"\e~ :1\ an in\lnJClor ,11 Ihc Roc~)' ~fountain File Ac~dcm)' and the DFD proper lraining ilnd prcparation, High.rise firefigluing and. sp<:cifi-
Officer TraininG PrClGrJm and firc Acadml)". ~fcGrJil h:l' lauphl \'arious , cally. standpipe o~rulions are no differ~nt. In facl, these opo:r:llions
subjecls from rilegrClund slralcg)' :lnd taelies to lechnieallt'~cuc for lire de. : may require a higher level of lraining and devclopmcnllhan our t)'pi.
partmcnls lhlouphoullhe RfXk)' Mountain repion, He hn 1.....0 a~~fXi:lIe's of i cal "bread and buner" operJlions, For firefightcrs 10 operale effee-
applied science decrees in lire science lechnolon from Red Rocks i lively; efficienlly: and, most imponanlly, as safet)' as possible in
Communily ColleGe and :I bachelor of science degree in human resource i high-rise buildings. Ihere musl be u dedicalcd lraining program lhat
manaGement and in fire scrvice adminimation rlom Mctropolilan Slale I focuses specifically on lhe slilts associaled wilh lhey. operations.
ColleGe of Den\'cr. He has served as a damoom and engine company I
h:lnds.on lrnining inslnJclor at the Fire o.:panmenl Instl1Jctors Confmnce ! THE DENVE R fiRE DEPARTMENT HANDS-ON PROGRAM
and is a meml>cr of hs educational ad\'isof)' board, I The Denver Fire Depal1mcnl tDFD) uses a unique hands-on train.
I
,
1
rlRE ENGINEERING March 1999 69
, . .
~ r::-"""'~:".",, 4.. ..~..
" -
,~.:......"....'.L ~L......J:_.'~' :.................~..:..._..._......_.____.-...:..~ ........ ....~......._I..._.._.___
noor .r.lDI "D lhl
ll1tthlniul IntI, ~!It"
noor, "tJJil.le ~r.jllb.
lbe base .nd lh.
t1e1n~p Dptulioa,
IPbolo b~ Patrick J.
X,'Nl" DrD Slltly .nd
Tlilining DjyisinJ
fire pumps, and Ihe
water now alanns at
and near lhe :!Sth.
noor st3ndpip'~ oUllel
are ta~cn off.l ine to
prevent a fnlse aCli-
vation of Ihe build.
ing's firc alarm s)'s.
lem. Of course, be.
fore Ihe DFD leaves
thc building at Ihe
cnd of the da)', il en.
sures Ihat the build.
ing engineers' relurn
all or Ihe building's fire proteclion and deleclion syslems 10 nomlal
s.crvke:.
Wilh the ho-cline pr(l~rl) laid oul nnd charged, the r,;ocruil~ are:
now r~';ld~ 10 ,llIcmpl aov.l1lCCIn,;olll out onto the firc Ooor.
The ba,it:~ arc al\\ a) s cmphJ~i7ed and pracliced. including Ihe
follo\\ ing:
. TIle a\1ad.. learn ~hould rClrie\ e Ihe maqer l..c~'s rrom the lobby
conlrol ollicer llf lhe fire Command Ccnler lock box b-:forc pro.
ce-cding up 10 Ihe inlerior ~laging ;lrea,
. Re\'il'w the ODor plan of Ihe Ooor below Ihe nre Ooor 10 g:lIher
an)' crilical inronnalion on the noor la)'ouI or olha imponant fac.
lors, ir lim~ r~rmit~, bdore cOllll11cncing Ihe ;llIack. 1i00\ercr. in
Ihis building. Ihe :!91h noor is :1I;lually a mech:lI1lcal level, and the
I~) oul or Ihe ODor helo"' i~ compk"'c1)' dirfcrenl. 11lcre arc no un.
occupied Ooors in Ihe building: Ihcrcforc, the mechanical !crt:! is
u~ed for Ihis ponion or 1he training drill ~causc thc ho~cljn:: can
be ndvanced :lI1d drOlined on this noor \\ ilhouI cau~ing damage.
. Feellhe door for hcal. :lI1d (lrcn il 5101,1,'1)' 10 delcnninc if ad-
vancement oul onlo the fire noor is possible based on the rolumc
of fire and firelighlers' abili,)' to ~upprcss il.
. Crew~ should bring se\'eral forcible: cnlf)'/e:\il l001s in case ,he
l.:cys do nol \\ork or Ihe h,;o:ll rrom lhe fire has damaged the door in
; a n:al silUation.
· ff Ihe door has to be forccd. maintain the inlc1;rily of Ihc door so
Ihal il can be shul. if ncccssar)'. 10 prolccI Ihe crew and ;111)' occu-
r.lIlb \I. ho may bc evacuating from above.
pa~llhe ~j
With Wa. ;
~ ODor
\
nlllar WI- ,
~s up :'
J r landin. ,-
: attack
J Ihe I1tt
. f l
,a ely iln. ,
d
: recruilS,
'lch haJld..'
or. How~"J
g a lr:Jin-;~
.hing thc'::
k is nol'
.Intin the
Jrill. All
Iso, hose
~hould a'
lIer is as.
Ie oUllet
mcs
The Alt;!cl
Crews advance lhc handline out 01110 thc firc Ooor in full PI'E in. '
duding SCBA, and all rccruils are worJ...ing "on air." Si>. recruil
"firdighlers"-represcnling 1\\0 DFD engine companies-;ld\'ance '
. 'the: "hig line" oul onto [he {irc Ooor. TIrc pump operillors in lhe
. 'treel arc pumping into the building's slandpipe sy~tcm. (DFD min-
imum swrfing is four per comp:JIl)', including Ihe company orlicer.)
A MandJrd DFD firs1.alaml a~~i~11I1lenl to a reponed nre in a high.
risc building consisls of 31leasl 26 personnel-lhree engine compa.
nics, lwo truck companies, onc rescue company, and lwo di~Iricl
. ~:. ~'..~hiefs. 111e incidenl commander may add an addilional company to
..~ .
liRE ENlilNHRINli MOlCh 1999 81
For More Fuels CIrcle 119 on Reply Card
High-Rise Firefighting: Preparing Your Firefighters for the Worst
I
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IFar lelt) The recruit It.
tuk lum In lull PP!
and -on lir" prepares
tllldtance lhe handline
out onla lhe lire f1aor.
Utfl} Firefi~hte'" Ire
positiDned It Ihe till'-
..en la help advance
the has eline, IPhotDl by
Palrick J. KeIrns, DFD
Salely Ind Training
Division.J
2. Compan)' oFfi.
cer: superviscs the
cntire operation.
3, Backup firefight.
er: backs up direct!)'
behind the nozzle op-
erator.
4. Comer firefighter. positioned at a comer to help advunce thc
hose line.
5, Comer firefighter: positioned at a comer 10 help ad\'unce the
hoseline.
6, Door firefighter: positioned at the entr:mce door to the fire
floor. ror sa rely purposes and to help ad\'ance the hoseline,
Strategically placing firrrighters at Ihe comers an)'lime Ihe hose.
line makes a turn enables this two-enginc campan)' allack team 10
} rve 3S a "s3fet). company" (OFD rapid intervention leam), as "ell
.s an air supply unit and the collapse unit 10 pro\'ide protection
(rolll railing debris ror hose lines and pump operators in the street.
Additional alanns are immediately requcsled when the first compa.
nics find heavy smoke or fire.
111c Iraining drill al\3ck leam members :Ire positioned as follows:
I. Nozzle opera lor: direclS the stream under the supervision or
Ihe unicer.
When You're on the Fire Line ... So are We!
UL~Classifled Flame-Resistant Brush Clothing from PGI
Firdishlcrs who Il'wlthe beSI specify POI's FIRELI~ETl>I (or lOp qu.:llit), Wildland Fire Fighting Clothing,
PROTECTIO~. Only !he beSI qualil)', mos' II idely accepled flame'resisl;ull fabrics are used. All
h.'rd...,:Lre such ;u zippen. irucrlining and lhread are namc'resiuaJ11.
BOlhfabri. and hard,,'Qrr art: IMIf! P<JII)' ctrtifitd 10 meet indus.
uy sland.1rds (or n~mc resh.ance.
CO:o,IFORT. Unlil.c hOI and cumb<:nome slructur:ll lire
lighling gear. flRELISEN garmen's are desi~ned 10
millimj~t htlll sInH, G:mnenu are grnrr/lloly ("III and
lighl "ei[!hl, allollo'ing ma.\imum rre-edom or movement.
Fabrics line c:'-cclleot bre~lhabilil)' <lnd mohlule ah<-orlxllc)'.
Dl'RADlLITY. All ~ams are dOllhle.needle rocl.slilch~d.
SlrlJS srams art snrn rwirl .. once Il'ith a flve.thread ufet)'
slitch, Ihcn lop-stitched Il'hh a double.needle lodslilCh 10
ab~olulely climin3re 50Cam failuru, MOT(" stitchrs ptr Inch alld
hrarifr rhrrod Ih311 is sl311danJ in Ih!: induslf)' h u!>C'd lhroughou1.
GU^RA~TEED. UL.Classifird to me-el or uceed NFPA's 1977
Sland.1rd on Prolc-eli\le Clolhing Ind Equipment for Wildland Fire
Fighling llI1d the requiremenls of Cal.QSIfA
Anicle 10.1, Scelion ~c),
QUICK DELJ\'ERY. Mo~' popular models ClI'oililhlr flnm stncL.
F.XTESSI\'E LJ:"iF., A\ ail~"le in -hi/h, rJ:l1', ('(l~h ;IOJ IUIN"ui., In
i',l-
ler fire departmtnts and othrr agtncirs trained in the building {or thrcr months, the
:al drill scenario consistrd ofthe sixth and si:Ucnth (toors wing ignitcd at the same time.
~ he opportunity to use a 13-floor
j 3partment building for live fire
training over a three-month
hi period is one that most fIre-
D.. fighters will np.ver have. That,
.wever, was the case for the Prince
,'Orge's County, MD, Fire and EMS
:partment, which conducted a series
training sessions at the Park 16
Jartments in Ch:on Hill.
The U.S. Department of Housing
:d Urban De,,'elopment (J-WD) turned
~ building over to county authorities
1en it fell into disrepair. Fire and
lice departments, as well as nwner-
s outside agencies, then used it to con.
d Cld.ensive training operations.
iroricoJ Background
The build.i.ng was a 13-{1oor, T-
Ipcd high-rise, ....;th two floors below
,de from the front. Designed and built
m 1967 to 1969, the 21o-unit building
5 an upscale ~out-or-city" address.
er the )'cars. the neighborhood deten-
Ited o.nd living conditions in the build.
~ bec.1lne unacteptable. 'The site was
.ntunlly taken over by HUn, which
s unable to rescue it and turned it
'~e county for disposition. Coun.
;i Ve Wa>'1le Curry seized this
--
j9ashoor is a battalion chiefin the
..~JGcorge's County, MD, Fire and
fS Department.
opportunity to continue rehabilitating
the deterloraLed inner.beltway commu.
nities. Curry, with the fmal intention of
razing the structure, turned th e building
over to Prince George's County Fire
Chief Ronald J. Siarnicki.
Training Opportunities
Working with the count);S housing
office, the county police department con.
ducted extensive forcible entry and K-9
dog training in the building. The fire
department then took o,,'cr and complet-
ed the building's demise. Siarnicki
tasked me ",ith developing a compre-
hensive training and evaluation plan.
The pennit process consisted of NFPA
1403 compliance with utility company
signolI; the county health department
inspection for hazardous conditions and
fire department acquisition of an "open.
bum" pcnnit.
The Fifth BatL."LIion slation officers,
Captains 'Thomas Hayden, Kenneth
Fusco and Carl Dro....'n and Lieutenan18
Douglas Sudick and Douglas Barth-
olomew were asked to assist ....ith the
development and preparation for the
massive undertaking. It was clear that a
tremendou.'l amount of offoduly time
would be required for the organizing
body to make the project successful.
Organi:wtional and development duties
were broken down into Ii..'e main areas:
By MARC S. BASHOOR
Organizations and Administration;
Logistics; Safety Considerations; Evalu-
ations; nnd Instructor Scheduling.
Assisted by Acting Deputy Chief Wil-
liam McGovm, lhis group proceeded to
organize and implement .....hat was
described as the "largest knovo'n lh'e fIre
training exercise in the United Slates."
Sire Preparation
The building was vacated by il.<; res-
idents about 18 months before it .....as
Dcquired by the rue department. Mini-
mal contents were available to simulate
realistic conditions. Due to the lack of
certain on.site resources, a full comple-
ment of administrative help would be
neces.s.aI)' to accomplish our main goal:
real.time, real.life, me:mingful training,
with meaningful feedback.
The building sprinkler system had
been vandalized extensively and was
not sil\'ilge.1b1e. A small leak in the
standpipe WIlS easU.r repaired. Although
the fIre pwnp was not operational, there
wns a 7()O.gpm pri,,'atc hydrant, sup-
plied by 11 six-inch feeder, 75 fc-et from
the building siamese. Thl! 12.inch sup-
ply pipe at the main road supplied
appro>.imawly 5,000 gpm. The 'instruc-
tor suppl)' line" (11 secondary water
SOllJ"'Ct!) was supplied from this main, A
!lingle thrce-inch supply line was run
from the road, across the parking lot,
Flrchou6e/Jul)' 1999
1
II
r
t
f:
f!
Se
@~
cial events radio. This nllowed partici.
pating companies to use the nonnnl
fire departl1lent.fireground~ channels,
'~''', '1Ule the instructors used the other
Iios.
A dry-crase command.ancl-rontrol
board was dc\'c1opcd, which pro\'cd
hl'lpful in delinenting Meas of respon.
sibility. tkfore each day or segment of
instruction, all of the instructors gath-
ered for a safety briefing by the
instructor-in-charge enCl. The speci.
fied details of the evolutions and o.reas
of e\'wuntion were de"eloped and dis.
cussed here. Safety was always the
o\'eniding concern. Instructors had
c>.-plicit authority to remove
personnel or halt situations
as they saw fit. This authori.
ty was employed on three
occasions.
Immediately following
evaluated evolutions, the
instructors gathered again to
go over the obsen'oo perfor.
mnn':e. After the companies
went through rehab, every.
one reported to a classroom,
where the lIC conduded a
thorough dt'briefing and cri.
tique. Unit officers were
given the opportunity to
explain procedures or actions
'''at may not h.1\'e fallen in
acceptable crileria category. 'Ibis for-
e proved bcnt'fidal as ideas were
shared and lessons learned.
Training Opportunities
The opportunities were limit.cd only
by our imagination. The following hul-
lets give a brief description orlhe activi-
ties during the three-month operation:
· Live fire as well as search and
rescue training on all 13 floors by 19
jurisdictions. co\'ering four states, the
District of Columbia and six military
installations.
· Baker Life Chute evacuation
demonstrations (sliding to the ground
through a nct affixed to the roaO. A U.S.
Park Police helicopter assisted in lifting
the awkv.'ard equipment to the roof.
· A regional collapse learn drill
invoh'ed demolishing a portion of non.
bearing wall, confmcd space work and
appHc:ltion of shoring techniques.
· During Nationallnstitutc ofSlan-
dards and Technology (NlSTI fIre model
testing, four npartments (two three.bed.
room units and tv.'o two-bedroom units)
were completely refurbished, including
"'aU and paint. Identical furnishings
purchnsed for like apartments.
Inkl~rs were inst.'\lIed in one of the
).,.,bedroom and one of the lhree.bed.
room units, Thenllal couplings and
78
other sophistic.'\lcd monitoring equip-
mcnt was brought in to facilil:lte "live"
ftre model testing, To their knowledge,
this level of e),,1tmsi\'e fIre model testing
in an actual building had never been
accomplished prior to this event.
· An ongoing Fire Fighter 1 class
was brought in for overhaul and breach.
ing work.
· The Hazardous Malerial Team
conducted nuclear, biolobical and chcmi.
ca1 G\TBC) simulnnt dispersal testing, as
would occur in a terrorist attack. Moni-
toring equipment was used to track air
movements through the building, Con.
tainment and suppression t.e<:hniques
were practired and evaluated.
· Fire investigators field work
included investigators from Prince
(k.orge's Count)', the international Asso-
ciation of Arson Investigators UAAn,
Maryland Arson Investigators (r,W>,
the Burenu of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF) and the Federal Burenu
of Investigation (FBI).
· Fi('ld testing of several thennw
imaging de\;ccs.
· Testing the use of interior mBS,
ter stream devices in n simulated
office environment. The rear section of
wing 2 on the second noar was demol.
ished, except for bnthroom and
kitchen enclosures.
· Federal Emergency Management
Agenc)'lFEMA) search dog training.
· High angle team rapel training
nnd victim removal.
· Bomb squad terrorist activity
training.
· To.....er lndder work involved four
towers operating simultaneously to
extinguish a well.involved fire sho\\;ng
in 36 \vindows.
Lessons learned
· Physical training. We
found that the demand
placed on a department by
true high-rise firefighting
was taken for granted by
most of the departments that
participated, including our
own.
While some were betler
prepared than others, most
personnel and their supervi-
sors had an e)'e.opcning
experience during these exer.
cises. The importance of
physical training programs
cannot be understated, as
was consisWnll)' demonstral.
cd at our facility. Those participating on
a regular program of exercise were gen.
erally able to travel four Ooors farther
(using dcub1e-tiercd steps> than those
who did not participate in an exercise
program.
· Staffing levels. Engine compa-
nies \\;th three-person staffing Cound
themselves ill-prepared to mount an
nggressive att..'\ck or search after the
two-person interior crew had lugged aU
of its equipment up six, se\'cn, eight or
nine flights ofslairs.
While three-person crews may be
ndequnt..e for the typical EMS or sentice
call, we found it inadequate at this
building, Additionally, three.person
crews prevent immediate compliance
with "2.inf2-out" requirements.
· Rapid intervention tenms.
Departments need to focus on improved
implementntion of rapid intervention
teams Bnd their strategic plarement. ki
part of tJ18t focus, our department is re-
training each member in rapid inten'en-
tion and "save your own" t.cchniqUC5.
Unit officcrs must understand the impor-
tance of comrnunic.'\ling v.;th the inci.
dent commander (IC), os that mn~' relate
to the Ie's decision to initiate rapid inler-
"en lion team activity, especially in such
large nnd compartmentalized buildings
os this. We conducted potential rapid
Flrehouse/Jul)' 1099
II
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rE nc': US. fire scMCC". IlruC:onre.f '),l'&'lOns" So Ulnt at t1lC n'cit high.rise ,l~
'oJ L,IL'8nnUin wi4'1es.<;ed nunl~i:oUs, Jti(:hf "": U1CY ....ill notl~ (orgoUCtL"~ :. . ~
:~. :!~:ri.<;c)i~ Rcroos tile n!1lion.lnJ:::.{~1rh.lr':~'.'.-,,:<. .(~,~; i;j!~:' i" ;
.{;:.. ~.:'~ till'~ fires, UWl"\.! hnvc ~~:rl~OO!h. .....Council To\\'cr Fire :-'-:,,'
;Ji~gli0lnnd ci",lian (':nsl1altics~, ;_'-::;:..',~.::: ,'On Od.. 12, ]9')8, a,fi!,! ....115 ~'I)JrU!
'~~iJ;,:i.~~,~'.c..rcnect.on thl~ U:lqL~Ill.~ .~R<l J;.,~'(}n tJ)(! 21.st (loor of U,I?..c<;>unCl.l 'Ibw.
, remember U1Q;(! who were U\lIln.>(j (Uld " Apartments, n SL LOlUB hlgh.n..;c ~,
n:'kiUCd:lel US all'tnh time to lenm l1w ~oJd, d!")ncc. '11l.e fi~ Wo.s 'tli an elderly womcu;'
':ft,:.,.';..,: ~~-'.:._-~ u, ~~.: ~ - --' upnnmclll on" thnt flOOi-:'111ick LI .
,:tG~"ic Gl!r~r Ls Coml'wnimli071S ml11lllCt'r ' smoke rould be "f\CCl\ lc,stllng frnnl 'I
';:"and Fro-nk C. Sch;;p<.'r is dl'PIlI)' chit'f of lht" win:kM'S llM.e; ., ,.;.... ~
~t, ~t;~rA'uj~'Fjrt 'lkpartrm'nl, RaO! (In' ,Fir~::.'. ,Firnt-nm\;ng ~r~i"'~;li('~.; ll.'l"'lrtcd.Jo ,
.:: ho:~4) '~/Ilrilmtinc rditon. '~'.1 ;. . y';: ~'.-\ _ wurkiilg' ruu and' n''lUl':''tl..J n f.(",'\)~
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68
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;:;;(,_::.",.~":~.~."';'2 ::'...:.~/,;#.';':",~~::'..::~1-;~;7\" :::- ,:: ~.:i:~:iic;:i::i;':'~:3i,:.:;itL'"
.. '
:~ ':,:~~~::';~':!;\;:':'ii
'C(XIrtod
1 Tower,
50 resi-'
,'oman's
It black
'Om the.:,
. ....'.,:
...
n
,.Ind'
I .
)uscJJuly)9j'J9
.-.-..-.--+"-
nlann. Companies mnde Ulcir wn)' to thl!
21st (loor only to find it. chnrgro with
limoke. While nUempting a rescue, two
firefighters became disorientOO in the
smoke nnd ran out. of air. ,^11ile one of
them m.ade his way olf the floor safely,
ilie oOler - a fIre c.1pl.'lin - feU uncon.
seous and nearly lost his life.
TIl(l fire st.:utcd shortly after 9 A.M,
in the a.rea of ilie woman's bcd. She
unsuccc.."-Sfully fought the fire before
reporting it 1.0 the front desk. Once she
phoned in lhl! incident to the front desk,
she C).;t.ed the npartmenl, leaving her
hallway door open.
TIlll first alarm was dispatched at
9;35. By the time firefighters nnivcd on
the &eene a fev.' minutes later, Ole fire
h:ld c..c,ca]al.cd Dark sm.oke filled the hall
and the apartment. ....-indows luld venti-
la1Jxi. As the fire increased in intensity,
three o).')'gen bottles used by Ule resident
exploded. Flames shot from the ap~
ment ....indo....'S and e),icndcd upward.
Hca\"j' smoke d.1tkened the C.\1crior wall
ofilie 27-swry ap:utment. building.
Extra alarms were quickly struck to .
bring firefighters and t>quipment t.o !he
sa!M. Ewmtu.lllly, the fire went to an
eighth almn.
Al 9:56, it was I'ejXlrtcd that a civil-
ian could be seen hanging out of a win-
dowon the fire 1100r. TIle fIrefighter and
captain mentioned amvc had just exil<<J
the fire Door and were enroutc w get new
air t3nks, Hearing the r;'ldla report, they
dl!cidcd tD go back in to attempt a rescue.
Altno\lgh b:Jth firefighLcrs knew they
were low on air, they entcro::l Ule smoky
hall and !.ried to find Ule !r.lpJX:d civilian.
This decision nearly cost both firefighters I
Uwir livcs. OnCE back on the fire Ooor, I
Uwy immediately ran into trouble. Low
on air and in an e:..wmely hot, smok")"
en\'ironment., the firefighters lost their
way. DL<;(lrientcd. they struggled to get
back to t11l! door they had just entered.
TIle firefighter mnde it back to the st-ur-
weU, but the captain did n.ot. The C3plain
was later found fare down and unwn.
scious on the floor.
'Tve often said !hat if one of my fire-
fighlcrs ever got kilk-cl or seriously hurt,
J would immediately call in an ouLside
in\'estigation team," said Fire Commis.
sioner and ChicfNeil J. Svet.anics. '1'ltis
was one ofthosc times."
Fl"cqucnt Occurrence ,
High.rise firefighting is not new to I
Sf.. lAuis firefighters. High-rise office
buildings, apartments, hot.cls, hospitals
nnd housing projects adorn the city's
skyline. MlUlY of these buildings do not
have sprinkler or standpipe systems.
Fires Q/XUl' ftuquenUy in these build-
ings, In f.1ct, the day afi.cr the Council
Firchou6~July 1999
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Jndicllle 137 on Reader SCf\;CC Card
Tbwer fire. there were two
more working high-rise
fires in the City ofSt. Louis.
These two fires were fought.
.........\ -:essfully and held to one
, m and two ala.rms,
,..pectively. There have
been several high-rise fires
since then, but none or them
have reached the magni.
tude of the Council 'Ibwer
fire.
'The Council Tower
building is a familiar struc-
ture to neighboring fire
companies. Companies
otkn l"CSpOnd to this build-
ing foo: medical calls. fire
alarms, food on the stove
and othcr smnll fires. The
eight-alnnn fire of Oct.. 12
was the most serious fire at.
this building to date.
Because of the serious
injury sustained by the fire
capt.'lin at this fire, Svctnn-
lcs request..cd an investiga-
tion be conductOO by the
National Fire Prol.ection
Association CNFPA) and the
National Institute for Oa:u-
pational Safety and Health (NlOSH).
Representatives of the International
Associ a tion of Fire Chiefs (lAFC) and the
f'There are no new lessons fa be learned from
a firefighter's death or injury. The cause of
tragedy;s usually an old lesson we have not
learned or have forgotten along the way."
-Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn, FDNY
International Association of Fire Fight-
ers GAFF) were also asked 10 partidpale
in the investigation. 'The remainder of
this article will add.rcss the investigation
and final report submitted by NlOSH.
NIOSH Investigation
NlaSH immedialely began its inves-
tigation once requested by Svetanic:s. Its
report, lrifur,)' in the Line o(Duty...A Sum-
mary of a NIOSH Firefighter Injury
Inue.sticationJ and numbered 98F-26. was
published on Feb. 23, 1999. The investi-
gation was thorough, timely, and con.
ducted with the full participation and
cooperation of the S1. Louis Fire Depart-
ment. After the investigation was com-
pleted and the report final.izcd, 10 recom.
mendations were offered in the report in
an effort 10 minimize the risk of similar
'rrcnccs in the future. Like\\isc, these
mnendations are offered to educate
j' reader of this nrticle 60 that these pit-
',<><.,/.Js can be avoided by you.
70
Soot slaiM lht uterjor of this St. Lou;s
high.ri.se a{ttr fire raced through a 2Jst-
floor apart1TWllt.
mOSH Recommendations
1. Fire depmtments should ensure
that all stan dan! operating procedures
(SOPs) regarding high.rise tirefighting
operations arc foUowed.
2. Fire departments should ensure
that incident conunand always main-
tains close accountability to monitor the
location of nlJ firefighters on the fire.
gT'OWld.
3. Fire departments should eTlSW"C
that all officers and firefigh~rs who are
involved in firefighting, re..c:.cue or oUler
hazardous duty wear and use personal
alert safety system (PASS) devices.
4. Fire departments should ensure
that. a rapid intervention team is in place
before conditions become unsafe.
5. Fire departments should develop
and implement a written respirator
maintenance program for nlJ respiratory
protective equipment used by firefighlers.
6. Fire departments should ensure
Omt firelighters entering nn immediately
dangerous to Ufe nnd hca1Ul (IDLH)
ntmosphere lutve fully charged air t.nnks
on their sclf<:onlaincd breathing appara.
tus (SCBA).
7. Fire departments should ensure
Ulnt at least four firefighlcrs 00 on the
SCCile before initinting inlcrior firelight-
inO' operations at a structural fire - 2 inn
ouL
8. Fire departments should consider
attaching a rope 10 a pcnnanent object or
placing a bright, narrow-beamed light
(e.g., laser) at the entry portal 10 a struc-
tural fire 10 ass ist lost or disoriented fire..
fightc~ in emergency escape.
9. Fire departments should ensure
that procedures are esLab 1ished to record
fircgroWld radio communications.
The St. Louis Fire Department has
taken a proactive approach in address.
ing the NIOSH recommendations.
Even before the report was finalized,
the department purchased needed
equipment to fully ~st SCBA. As of
this writing, all SCBA have been test.
ed and meet the manufacturer's oper.
ating standards. It showd be noted
here that the St. Louis Fire Depart-
ment had an SOP in place for the use
and mainl.ennnce of SCBA. mOSH
made several recommendations to
improve this procedure, which are
being implemented as of this writing.
'The department had a well "..ritlen
high.rise SOP in place. All firefighters
were trained on this proccdW"C under live
fire conditions in the department's 5C\'en-
story training tower and the procedure
was successfully used at numerous high-
rise fires. After the Council Tower fU'C,
this SOP went under considerable scruti-
ny. In addition, the high-rise SOPs of 60
of the nation's hugest fire dcp,trtments
were reviewed by the St. Louis Fire
Department. 'Ibis research revealed that
ool)' minor revisions needed to be made
10 the department's existing standard. In
fael, the high-rise operating procedure
used by t11C SL Louis Fire Department
when compared 10 other deparbnents
was cqualto or better than most.. 'The les-
son learned here is obvious. SOPs, no
matter how well written and trained on,
aJ"(! useless if the)' are nol followed on the
firegroWld.
The St. Louis Fire Department
uses the 20-Minute MARC for its
accountability system. This "Member
Accountability Roll Call" system is easy
to use and is one of the most effective
accountability systems used in the fire
service today. The system is initialed at
all working fires and an accounting of
all fireground personnel is taken 20
minut.es into the incident. Unfortu-
nately, at this fire, the flfSt 20-Minule
MARC was not taken. Since this incl.
FirchouscJJuly 1999
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dent, lhe imporlnncc of the 20-
Minute MN{C has been reem.
phasized Bnd command person.
nel monitor its ~ morc closely.
The St.. Louis Fire Depart-
ment nssembles 28 firelighters on
'\ -1\ its first nlnnn dispalchcs. The
I :wtment's SOPs for structural
.d high.rise fIres arc designed
....ith firefighter safely in mind.
This includes the 2.Uv2o(Jul role
and rapid intcrvention. (It should
be noled here that at this high.
rise fire, by the lime lhe two fire.
fightcrs became lost on the fire
floor, there were npproximalcly 75 firo.
6gh ters on scene. The 2.in!'2o(Jut rule was,
therefore, a non.issue, In addition,
enough fire companies had reached base
as to assemble st.'Veral rapid intervention
teams had anyone known lhe firefighrers
were in trouble.)
Conclusion
Freelancing got these firefighters
into trouble. Bolh firefighters entered the
fire floor knOY.ing their air tanks wefC
near depletion. Neither had activat.ed
their PASS deviOlS. The captain did not
inform the operations chief of their inten.
tions,As n rt.>sult, when they gol into trou.
ble, no one knew .....hat they were doing or
where they were.
How much safer is foam?
A. St. Louis Fir~ Deparlnunl Burcau 0/
EMS Discutcr Response V~hjd~ was on
scene '0 trell' ,Ilt injured.
Firefighting is a d.'U1gerous job, but
that does not mean firefighters hm'c to
work dangerously. Firefighter safety al a
working fire, especially a high.rise fire,
must be paramounL The prUn3Jj' respon.
sibility of aU chief officers at B fire scene
is the safety and nccounLnbiUty of aU the
firefighters on the fireground. This
should take precedence over all other
fircground activity. To disregard this
obligation or to say "there was no time to
do it'" is irresponsible. Too many firefight,.
ers ha\'e been injured or lost Uteir livcs
because "there .....as no time to do it. ~
But it takes more lhan jusl 5a)ing,
"l.hc fire department should
ensure..... to gel. Ole job done. For
who is the fire depnrlmenl? Who
is responmble? Who is ncmunt.-
able? 'The responsibility for fire..
fighter safely falls on many shoul.
ders nnd that includes lhosc orihc
firefighters and not just chief offi.
cers or the flf(! commissioner.
During the hent of hattie, fire-
fighters can neither forget their
training nor disregard their snrely
equipment. All pctronnc1 at the
scene must adhere to the "play
book"; lhnt is to say, the SOPs
must be followed. CJmpromising such
lhings ",ill only lead to more tragedy.
Tragedy caused by this "old lesson we
have not learned or have forgolten along
lhe way;
But perhaps the most glaring recom.
mendallon round in the report is number
10. The report states, "thal municipali.
ties should require all high.rise apart-
ment.s for lhe elderly have sprinkler sys.
terns installed and opcr3ble .....ere feasi.
ble." Had that been the case in the CJun.
cil Tower fire and in the other high-rise
fires written aoout in this issue of Fin:!'
hoUSC@, firefighters would be alive today,
no one would be hurt and we wouldn't be
v.Titing this article. Some lessons are
ne\'er learned.
it,._
Plain water.
Precision foam.
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While one company Is still fighllng using plain water, another company is
heading home after (aster knockdown with precision foam on a comparable
fire. At leaslSO% faster knod:do...m means a Jot less time in a risk sItuation.
For the ani)' foam proportioner \\ilh precise, aUlomatic mixing and metering,
and brule strength rcIlablll)', conlact us aboul a demo and fREE Foam
'mle Easy video.
J 72
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1F1nJ~PRO~
Prrchlon room rvery am~.
Hypro ~n /10 WICOR COIolPAI-/r
37S FllI~ A.e, NW. Ne.. a"g~lon, loiN SS112.320a
Phone:(6S 1j7U.UOD . Fu:(GS lja6.6600
Indicate 139 on Reader Scro.;cc Card
Firehouse/July 1999
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Raymund I.,'hr i,~ (J 2~l'YL'ur ['!'Ia,
an of the ll(lltittlu"~ ('[t) FIr,'
D,'purtnll'nt, I'lIrro[lly Mr( illg (I.~
(J,~,~isl(Jfll chi,., or /'hlfJlliflG .I:-
1('cllllicol Sal'icl'$ ami Ihe Cily o!
llaltimor.,'.' pr".,,'cl diro'ctor for lilt,
tH'lt' tWO ,\11{: Curr;ml,r.rrnrlUfI
~'.rSI(,1Il5, Afl.'r till' ..lleas.'!I.!
cutO['l'r ofth., fitI' c!r{lu/'IIIII'f1llu5t
.July, la' IHls />""11 Il'Orl.:illJ: 10 brill};
III., po/ie!' ami Pllhlu: s,'r['iCl's 011
[Ulo' in tilt' filllrlll {IIHlF rt'r of Ih.'
YI'(Ir.
The odds were shlckL-d Dl,raimit the fircfightcn;, but their skill,
evumge, SIx.'1..'iaJizt.-d tmining, innomlion and 11 he4lvy dLISC of luck
n....;ol\'l'\! this inddent with onl)' on" ei\i!ian fatalit)'. Mayor l\urt L
Schm()y,l', wbo wa." on thL' Stl.'llt' purl)' in t}l(.' fIn." pmi.."4.x! the wurk
uf fin,figbt~'l':; ill -avl:rting wh.lt rould h:l\'t: l....:en a J'('\'el~ tragl'1.lyP
'l1w ('ight.alann lJlal.l' W.L~ fimght by 173 fin.'fighlcr.;, including
tile !;Ilt'tially traint.-d lligh.risp Evacuation Aerial Ti.':1m n fEAT
u-am) that W,L<; in~'rt('(l un thl~ I'l ~Jr uf Ill!.' It,liJding at the hL'ight of
the fire. A 1'hit1 of ~'\'l'n fif\! di~IJatdlL'r., :1IIt! ] S I,olirt! call1:1kt-~
prucc:>."-I,'\1.113 l:'llWrgl'rll)' mils dulillg the Cllsi,;, ;\to!'\.' Ulan a dtl/o'll
Baltillllln: pulkc onken; hl'lp.,'\l calm l1..'<,idl'llL-> allt! L'\'al1late thl'
luwer 1lU<.1r;.:, Ot/Wl' ngl'llril.'s, sllch a.~ tJll' Cellt!'al :-.tarybm! Chapter
of U1l' American lu.otl Cru~"" HalthllL)!'\.' City n..'prutml'nl of Public
Work..." Maryland ~ta.....'" T'~\ll.~it Adrnini,;tr.llion ulld lllall)' otlll'~
Fi n' hOUSl'J.J \I] Y I !J!l!)
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ling
,;AT
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",ers
.zen
.lem
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almc to OJ(! 6mJ1C and nssis1.OO in cxtrn.
crdil1.?J)' ways. To n person, l>vel)'tme
involved in this extreme emergency has
bccn.fon:wcr touchl'd by Ole danger, fear,
desperation and cvcnturu joy of con.
tributing to the resolution of this polen.
tial mass-casualty 5O:!nnrio in onc of the
best outcomes imaginable. This summa.
ry will wll some ofthcir stories.
"Alarm Ik tIs Ringing"
Dispatcher Susan Sampson lx>gan n
lZ.hour olvertimc tour shift. t.he night of
Feb, 4 anticipating the usunl heavy vol.
ume of calls for medical nssist.'lncc. 'Thc
flI'C department'll 18 advanced life sup-
port (AlSl units typicnlly get. depleted
between lhe hours of 4 P.M. and 1 AM. The
early-morning hours of Feb. 5 were like
so many oUler in her 17 yca.rn serving
Baltimore, first as a 911 c.alltaker and for
the past scvcn ye.'U'S as a fIre disp.1Ichcz:
The e\'(ming rett1ed into the "quiet
tirne~ oflhe shill when Lieutenant Roland
E. "Butclt Greaver took II 911 call a11:22
A..M. for "alarm bells ringing" at IS S.
Charles St., a 3Q.st.ory nparlmcnt building
that hnd I1XpCricncro false nlarms fUld the
oo:.asional "pot. of food"; even the callcr
indicatOO "it mightlJc r.~."
Engine 23 from downto\\ll Slcndman
St.'ltion and Truck 1 from OJdtown Sta-
tion were dispatc.hed to invcstigaw at
1 :2.1. As the rigs entered Ole bn.>czy night.
time nir, a rapid string of events began.
At ne.'lrby Oldtown Station, firefighters
including Serond Battalion Chief Robert
\ViJliams, a 30-ycar vclemn, didn't have
to look long. Hc shoul.<<l as he saw /lames
spurting from the upper floors.
At Uw newly occupied Fire Commu-
nications center n few blocks t.o lhf! south,
Greaver didn't get Ule chance to "take a.
look" from the 12th.floor windows
because Ow 911 s\~itchboard lit up y,ith
scveral calls - n1wnys n bad sign. A secu.
rity guard in the Charles 'lbwers lobby
reported. '11lCflJ'S a fire in the Charles
'lbwer, Ap.artment 1501." Greaver asked,
"Do yuu know what's burningT TIle
caller checked with Ole apartment occu-
pant, who had made his way to the lohby.
"He says it's his sofa." Greaver replied,
~OK. we're on the wny."
TIle occupant had awakened to dis.
cover Ow ftrc blazing in his Ihing room
!>Ofa and tried to extinguish tlle fire using
n blank(>l. After Oil? blanket caught fire,
he ran to open a ....indow "t.o let the smoke
out." In a st.nt..c of panic, he ran from tlw
np.1.rtment and was now in OIC lobby
\\;Ul Ule SC'CUrit)' guard.
As 01C Communications Center dis-
patched Ow rest of OlC full fin;t..alnrm
nssignment, Truck 1'5 officer radioed
from tile scene, "Hcn\')' fire, give me a sec-
ond nlann." Williams began his response
Fi re h 0 u sclJ ul)' 1999
.-
",- ....._ r- _--..~"
on t.hc !:l'C{Ind nlnnn. Arri\;ng unil.'1
found 5C\'crnl residents p:lL<;(:d lit upper-
floor ....-indows, preraring to jump. Fire-
fighwrs quickly call1'd ti) Olem, "Hold on,
wc're on our W(1)~" Pulicc used n bullhorn
to calm re.<;idenL'i; Truck 102 rnl<;ed its
aerial ladder lower to gut closer ti) Ow
terrified resident.'!, urging OWn! to wnit
for help from OJ[! inlcriur..Engine 23. t.he tirst-rluc enGine com-
pany, led otrdoublc lines and connl'Clecl to
!lw st.'U1dpipe nnd sprinkler siamese in
the rear of Ow building. The sprinkler
sitlmC!lC crocked nnd Llew oft l'lis fwd
no effect on Ow lire opcralioll.'1 because
onty the tower level was sprinklercd.
When Fillh Bnlt.'llion Chief Harry
Catterton arrived, he noticOO heavy tire
issuing from Ute 15th floor nnd c),tending
to upper /loom. He requested n third
nhmn at 1:29. Cnl.wrt.on set up a com.
mand in the lobby, but. found no building
personnel there to meet Olt!m.
"'VI'e started going Ulrough Ow draw.
ers and making efforts to secure keys," he
said. TIle elcvator was not equipped (or
61
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immediately boarded Trooper 1 (os the
mooevac unit is known) m alQduct a
reconnaissance flight over the building.
A cool evening with winds gusting to
35 mph would test the skills of Derogge-
rio, the pilot, as he neared the 3O-story
building whkh W<l3 enveloped in smoke.
Severnl residents were n1ready gathered
00 the rooft.op. The Dumber of antennas
ana e. pentbause structure 0.... the rooftop
rendered it unsuitable for landing.
Scarpati decided to be "inserted" on
the roof to calm residents. and begin fire
, operations from above the fire. He and
Hartsock had practiced rapelling !rom
these birds many times, but tonight they
would nced their full protective clothing .
and se1f-amtnined breathing apparatus
{SCOO - another firsl On the ground.
fire units scouted possible landing sites
near the building should airlifting ofr-es.
idents become necessary.
As Scarpati and Hartsock began their
descent to the rooftop, they were bounced
into the underside of the chopper until
they were deae Once on the roo~ the two
firefighters reassured the residents who
had made their way there. Scarpati later
recalled, "'They were pretty calm, consid-
ering their situation. We told them we
roold evacuate them if necessar,y. but the
fire cre\\'S were making good headway."
Trooper 1 was joined by Trooper 3
from the Frederick, MD, barracks, and
three more two-man teams for a toW of
eight tirefightel~. were lowered to the
root: Each team descended through the
building, attending to the residents'
needs, directing them to the roof and
radioing status from above the fire. In all,
20 people were assisted to the roof and
later sheltered in a 30th-floor apart:rnent.
WhUe the aggressive fire attack on
floors 15 and 16 paid off; the fire had
extended to the 18th and 19th floors.
Pl'Ogres8 was beginning to slow down
because units had moved too far from the
staging area on the 12th floor. Staging
was then moved to the 16th floor.
The incident had escalated to an
eighth eJnnn at this point and these per-
sonnel supplied the suppression and tac-
tical units on the upper floors with air
bottles, radio batteries, tools and liquid
refreshment. The two air units filled 185
SCBA bottles during the incident.
Crews from the rool\op insertion, by
noiv being assisted by those who had
climbed the stairs from below the fire,
moved from floor to Door; ushering resi.
dents to the roof or down the stairs. The
aggressive attack rontained and extin.
guished the bulk of the lire \\ith many of
the occupants still sheltered on the upper
floors. This made the treacherous and
slow removal by heliropter unnecessary
and undoubtedly saved lives.
66
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TM Baltimore City Firt D~PQrt~nt Q~li.
vated it~ High.ris~ Evacuation A~rial
Team mEAT). hlem~rs were airlifted to
the roofofthe 3D.story building,
During the height of Ute fire, a cn1Jer
reported that a woman had rollapsed in
the stairwell on the 23rd floor. Several min.
utes elapsed while companies attempted to
push past the lire floors. A paramedic
fOW1d a 72')wr-otd woman in an apart.
ment, where a nurse was administering to
her. The p3tient was in full cardiac arrest
W1d CPR had been stmted. A medic crew
arrived and consulted via radio \\ith a hos-
pital trauma unit which evaluated the
patients \ital signs and advised CPRrould
be stopped. It was r.everal hours before the
victim could be canied down the stairway
to the lobby.
Rebecca still waited for rescue in
Apartment 2101. Third Battalion Chief
Frank Giotis led a rescue team above the
fire and found heavy smoke in the hall-
way. He made his way to 2101 and forced
open the door. Inside, he found Rebctta.
"1 led her to the stairn'ay and dO....'!1 to
the 14th floor, where I told her she WllS
now safe and to go to tho lobby area,R he
said. She was later transported to the
hospital and treated for smoke inhala-
aon. Sampson missed the rescue of her
new friend as she took other 911 calls,
She would have to wait for news reports
that interviewed a soot-covcred Rebecca
to finally breathe n sigh of relief.
Response Roster
A total of21 engines. 13 trucks, fi....e of
the city's eight battalion chiefs, nine of
the 18 medic units, 16 other units, includ-
ing both air cascades, and two Maryland
State Police helicopterS saw service at '
Charles Towers. This amounted W two.
thirds oflhl! on-duty fire depnrtm~t per-
sonnel that night. Units from Baltimore
County and Anne Arundel County
stnlfcd vacated stations during tho fire.
101re6ghters are well known f~r the '
inventiveness. They formed human
clw.ins on the stairNnys to pass equip-
Inent up and help residents escape down.
Grocery carts found in 11 tin;t-!loor stor-
age room wore pressed into senioo to
move air bottles in and out of the build-
ing. Police officers drove to n nearby hos.
pital and returned with wheelchairs to
move residents to several buildings in the
area that became makeshiflshelters.
McDonald declared the fire under
control at. 3:39 AM. Firelighters began a
secondary search ofC'lery apartment and
to undertake the overhaul operations
and 11 survey of the fire dn.tnnge.
Sampson received another call from a
resident who was still banicaded in her
bedroom and v.n1S evidently missed by
searching firefightern. Once again, a fire
crew climbed the stairs, all 23 flights, to
assure her that she could oome o~t now.
The 1D.st 911 call came at 6;34 A.\l from a
frantic woman who was threatening m
jump. All the dispatcher's assurances
couldn't help the woman. .....ho was watch.
ing TV reports of the fire, not realizing it
was remrded earlier. Firefighters were
sent to the apartment and forced their way
in, but oould find no on\!, When the dis-
p.1tcher called back, it was discm'en'd that the caller was in an ndj&~nt apartment
tower - not the one involved in the fire,
Thtal damage was estimated at $3
million. 'l\venty-six apartments were
condemned and dozens received smoke
and water damage. Nine ci\ilians were
taken to area hospitals, most for trent-
ment of smoke inhalatioD. There was one
civiliun fatality. Only one firefighter was
injured, receiving n minor bum. Consid-
ering the volume of fire, extreme rescue
operations, physical exertion and degree
of rlzk undertaken, this was astounding.
A3 a weary crew of dispatchers fin-
ished their tour, they were met by three
members of the BCFD Critica11ncident.
SIress Thain. They debriefed for just an
hour to release the built-up tension and
headed home for some weU-desetved rest.
With the light of day, it began to set-
tle into to everyone's consciousness that
a major disaster had been llDJTOwl)'
averted. Cruef of Department 'Villiams
stood on the sidewalk and looked sky-
ward. ''We came close to having a tower.
ing inferno right here in Baltimoret he
said. At. a press conference later thnt
moming, the chief proclaimed this fire to
be his proudest moment of his 45-year
career. ,
Firehouse/Juty 1999
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